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Like criminal prosecutors, family-court prosecutors have immense power. De-
termining which cases to prosecute and which to divert or dismiss goes to the heart 
of the delinquency system’s balance between punishment and rehabilitation of chil-
dren and the child protection system’s spectrum of family interventions. For in-
stance, the 1990s shift to prosecute (rather than dismiss or divert) about 10 percent 
more delinquency cases annually is as significant a development as any other. Yet 
scholars have not examined the legal structures for these charging decisions or 
family-court prosecutors’ authority in much depth. 
This Article shows how family-court prosecutors’ roles have never been fully 
theorized. Family courts historically avoided prosecutors (or lawyers of any kind). 
When children’s and parents’ lawyers appeared in the 1960s to 1970s, family-court 
prosecutors soon followed, but without any consensus about how they should make 
charging decisions or how their authority intersects with agencies or intake officers. 
This Article provides the first detailed description and critique of the varying state 
laws governing family-court prosecutors. 
This Article argues that family-court prosecutors should work for and repre-
sent juvenile justice or child protection agencies, which should have authority to de-
termine which cases to file. Agencies are best suited to balance the competing inter-
ests at stake in family-court cases and to choose specific cases on which to focus their 
limited resources. Agency control over intake could reduce delinquency prosecutions 
for relatively low-level offenses, which have particularly large racial disparities. Fi-
nally, an agency model should lead to limited judicial review of decisions to prose-
cute cases—a long-elusive goal in scholarship regarding criminal prosecutors. 
  
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. The au-
thor would like to thank Albertina Antognini, Annette Appell, Elizabeth Chambliss, 
Martin Guggenheim, Avni Gupta-Kagan, Clare Huntington, Cortney Lollar, Adrian 
Smith, Robin Walker-Sterling, and participants in a faculty workshop at the University of 
Kentucky College of Law and Duke Law School’s 2015 conference on civil rights, “The 
Present and Future of Civil Rights Movements: Race and Reform in 21st Century 
America,” for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. The author would like to thank Joni 
Gerrity for excellent research assistance. 
 
744 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:743 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 745 
I. FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION ................ 749 
A.  Prosecutorial Discretion in Family Court .......................................... 750 
1.  Juvenile delinquency intake decisions. ....................................... 750 
2.  Child protection intake decisions. ............................................... 754 
B.  Criminal Prosecutors’ Power .............................................................. 757 
C.  Agency Counsel versus Centralized Prosecutorial Control ............... 758 
II. HISTORY OF FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS: IGNORED AT THE ORIGINS, 
REQUIRED BY POST-GAULT REFORMS ........................................................... 760 
A.  Pre-Gault Procedure ........................................................................... 761 
1.  No prosecutors and not much due process. ................................. 761 
2.  Structural problems. .................................................................... 765 
B.  Post-Gault Pressure to Reform........................................................... 767 
1.  Pressures for reform in juvenile delinquency law. ..................... 767 
2.  Pressures for reform in child protection law. ............................. 769 
C.  Delinquency Prosecutors Reform ....................................................... 770 
1.  No immediate consensus. ............................................................ 771 
2.  A gradual shift to elected prosecutors’ control and prosecutors 
as a tool of tough-on-crime reforms. ............................................ 773 
D.  Child Protection Prosecutors Reform ................................................. 782 
III. THE CURRENT INCONSISTENT LANDSCAPE ................................................... 786 
A.  Juvenile Delinquency Prosecutors ..................................................... 787 
B.  Child Protection Prosecutors .............................................................. 791 
C.  Pre-Gault Vestiges .............................................................................. 795 
D.  A Need for Empirical Study ............................................................... 797 
IV. AN AGENCY MODEL FOR FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS ............................... 798 
A.  More Consistent with Statutory Purposes ......................................... 799 
1.  Different purposes from criminal prosecutions. ......................... 799 
2.  Elected prosecutors’ offices are not structured to apply a 
rehabilitative statute. .................................................................. 802 
B.  Structured to Coordinate Intake Decisions and Systemic Goals ...... 806 
1.  Child protection agencies. ........................................................... 806 
2.  Juvenile justice agencies. ............................................................ 807 
3.  Elected prosecutors’ control risks inhibiting agency 
coordination. ................................................................................. 810 
4.  Agency interests will more likely coincide with statutory 
mandates. ..................................................................................... 811 
C.  More Effective Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion ............. 812 
1.  Arbitrary-and-capricious review of an agency decision to 
charge rather than divert. ........................................................... 813 
2.  Judicial review as a tool to check racial and other disparities. . 817 
D.  More Democratic Accountability ........................................................ 819 
E.  Better Agency Counseling .................................................................. 821 
2018] Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors 745 
 
F.  More Equality across Geographical Boundaries ............................... 822 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 823 
INTRODUCTION 
The law and the academy have long recognized criminal pros-
ecutors’ immense power, especially the power to determine which 
cases to prosecute and which not to. Less attention has been fo-
cused on related issues in juvenile delinquency and child protec-
tion cases litigated in state family courts.1 There, determining 
which cases to prosecute and which to divert2 or dismiss goes to 
the heart of the delinquency system’s overall balance between 
punishment and rehabilitation of children, and the child protec-
tion system’s spectrum of interventions in families. 
Family-court prosecutors are lawyers who prosecute delin-
quency and civil child protection3 cases on behalf of the state in 
family court. They are worthy of special study because they 
should operate differently than criminal prosecutors, especially 
when it comes to their exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and 
because these differences have tremendous policy implications for 
 
 1 Different states apply different names to the courts that handle juvenile delin-
quency and civil child protection cases. For ease of reference, I refer to these as family 
courts unless referring to a source that uses a different term. 
 2 “Diversion” refers to the handling of a case outside of a formal court proceeding. 
In juvenile delinquency cases, children are typically referred for some kinds of services 
and are not prosecuted if they comply with the recommended services. In child protection 
cases, child protection agencies supervise a family and refer family members for services. 
 3 The term “prosecutor” has been long used in juvenile delinquency cases, but less 
so in child protection cases, though it is apt in both contexts. As Professor Douglas J. 
Besharov explained regarding child protection cases (in language equally applicable to 
delinquency cases): 
While the rehabilitative orientation of child protection proceedings should be 
preserved, it is a mistake to ignore, or deny, the essentially prosecutorial func-
tion of the attorneys who assist petitioners. First, the preparation and presenta-
tion of child abuse and child neglect cases often require hard nosed prosecutorial 
methods. Field investigations, in cooperation with the police as well as the child 
protection agency, may be needed. Recalcitrant witnesses may have to be iden-
tified and pressured into telling what they know. Opposing witnesses may have 
to be cross-examined effectively. . . . Second, the benign purposes of child protec-
tive proceedings should not obscure the fact that they may result in a major 
intrusion into family life. . . . [Such a proceeding] “by its very nature resembles 
a criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with conduct—failure to care 
properly for her children—which may be criminal and which in any event is 
viewed as reprehensible and morally wrong by a majority of society.” 
Douglas J. Besharov, The “Civil” Prosecution of Child Abuse and Neglect, 6 Vt L Rev 403, 
408–09 (1981), quoting Meltzer v C. Buck LeCraw & Co, 402 US 954, 959 (1971) (Black 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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the juvenile justice and child protection systems. These systems 
balance protection of individuals and accountability for offenders 
with an overriding focus on rehabilitation of offenders—so chil-
dren who have committed crimes do not reoffend and so adults 
who have abused or neglected their children can safely maintain 
or regain custody over them. In family court, the state should file 
and prosecute a case only when both (1) the facts necessary to 
support family-court jurisdiction exist (that a child has commit-
ted a delinquent act or that a parent or custodian has abused or 
neglected a child) and (2) family-court jurisdiction—rather than 
a less coercive intervention—is necessary to achieve the protec-
tive or rehabilitative goals. Charging decisions in delinquency 
and child protection cases thus differ from criminal cases, in 
which retributive and deterrence goals predominate and rehabil-
itation is not a large factor. 
Reflecting these different goals, both juvenile justice and 
child protection law have assigned important roles to administra-
tive agencies that do not have an analog in criminal law. These 
agencies provide for rehabilitative services and supervise chil-
dren and families. They often manage a spectrum of services—
from those offered to children and intact families in diversion pro-
grams to custodial placements for children ordered into foster 
care or secure juvenile facilities. 
These different goals and the administrative agencies created 
to further them lead to structural questions that have been 
largely ignored in the academic literature. Should family-court 
prosecutors work for elected prosecutors, for those administrative 
agencies, or for some other entity? Should the prosecutors or the 
agencies have authority to make charging decisions—known in 
family-court parlance as intake? States have reached divergent 
conclusions on these questions. Some state child protection agen-
cies determine which cases to file and have their agency attorneys 
prosecute those cases (eight states), some agencies decide which 
cases to file but are represented by lawyers from local prosecutors’ 
offices or other executive-branch agencies (twenty-five states), 
and some child protection agencies must instead work with other 
executive-branch attorneys who represent “the state” or “the peo-
ple” more broadly and hold the final authority over which cases 
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to file (eleven states and the District of Columbia).4 Juvenile de-
linquency prosecutors more consistently (though still with excep-
tions) have formal authority over which cases to file. But states 
vary in the balance of power between juvenile prosecutors and 
departments of juvenile justice or probation that employ intake 
officers to evaluate possible delinquency cases; some states give 
prosecutors complete control (thirteen states), some require in-
take officers to make recommendations to prosecutors (nine 
states), some authorize intake officers to divert cases subject to 
prosecutors’ review (eight states and the District of Columbia), 
and others authorize intake officers to divert cases regardless of 
prosecutors’ views.5 
This variability results from a history unique to family 
courts, which originally provided lawyers to neither the state nor 
respondent children and parents.6 State laws empowered private 
individuals to file petitions alleging that a child was delinquent, 
abused, or neglected.7 Court-employed intake or probation officers 
would determine which cases would be diverted and which would 
be prosecuted. 
The regular use of family-court prosecutors developed with 
the growth of the administrative state and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in In re Gault,8 which granted juvenile delinquency de-
fendants the right to counsel.9 Child protection agencies took on 
a larger role in intake decisions, determining in many states 
which cases they believed did not require court intervention. In 
delinquency cases, family-court prosecutors were initially envi-
sioned as carrying out the original vision of juvenile justice, filing 
cases only when the facts and the child’s circumstances suggested 
doing so would further the court’s rehabilitative purposes. But 
 
 4 See Part III.B. As described in Part III.B, two states authorize both agencies and 
elected prosecutors’ offices to initiate cases, and three states assign important roles to 
court intake officers. 
 5 See Part III.A. As described in Part III.A, one state gives authority to both prose-
cutors and intake officers to divert cases, and two states are outliers. 
 6 Some states permitted family courts to “request” an appearance by the district 
attorney—language implying the unusual nature of such appearances. See, for example, 
HB 153 § 63, 1959 Or Laws 719, 739, codified at Or Rev Stat § 8.685(1). Some of these 
statutes were later expanded to give prosecutors an “entitle[ment]” to appear. See, for 
example, HB 3449 § 4, 1991 Or Laws 1279, 1280, codified at Or Rev Stat § 8.685(3). 
 7 State laws used various terms, including “dependent” children. For ease of refer-
ence, I use “delinquent” to refer to children alleged to have committed acts that would be 
crimes if done by an adult, and “abuse and neglect” to refer to acts done by parents or 
custodians in violation of states’ civil child protection laws. 
 8 387 US 1 (1967). 
 9 Id at 41. 
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when juvenile crime rates increased and states responded with 
various tough-on-crime reforms, prosecutors took a more punitive 
approach. This shift, as much as any other reform, shaped the 
more punitive modern juvenile justice system, increasing the pro-
portion of cases prosecuted rather than diverted or dismissed—
an increase that remains to this day. 
This Article argues that family-court prosecutors should be 
attorneys employed by and representing comprehensive juvenile 
justice or child protection agencies. This structure would em-
power agencies, counseled by their lawyers, to determine which 
cases to file. Agencies are best suited to balance the competing 
interests at stake in family-court cases, especially compared to 
elected prosecutors, who are more likely to overemphasize puni-
tive responses to juvenile crime and child abuse and neglect. 
Nonlawyer agency staff are trained in child development and 
family dynamics and are better positioned than lawyers to distin-
guish the children and families who need court intervention from 
those who could benefit from other interventions. Comprehensive 
agencies are also best situated to understand the various re-
sources available for children and families and how those re-
sources are best deployed. 
In juvenile justice, agency control over intake could reduce 
family-court prosecutions for relatively low-level offenses, espe-
cially those arising at school. Such cases form an important part 
of the school-to-prison pipeline and have particularly large racial 
disparities. Through a better understanding of adolescent devel-
opment and available interventions short of family-court prosecu-
tions, a better balancing of punitive and rehabilitative goals, and 
a desire to focus limited agency resources on more severe offend-
ers, comprehensive juvenile justice agencies are more likely than 
elected prosecutors to conclude that the juvenile justice system’s 
goals are better served through greater use of diversion.10 
An agency model lends itself to limited judicial review of de-
cisions to prosecute individual cases. The absence of meaningful 
judicial review is a central challenge to reforming the power of 
criminal prosecutors—and there is no easy answer to that chal-
lenge. But if child protection and juvenile justice agencies are 
 
 10 That shift could also have upstream effects on arrest patterns and family-
court referrals. See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in 
Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 Cornell 
L Rev 383, 430 (2013). 
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charged with exercising prosecutorial discretion, they ought to es-
tablish standards to do so consistent with their rehabilitative 
statutory purposes, and failure to follow such standards should 
lead a court to dismiss the resulting petition. Such modest judicial 
checks can ensure that charging decisions at least consider family 
courts’ rehabilitative purposes while still generally deferring to 
executive-branch charging discretion. That result would help 
guard against the phenomenon of child protection agencies re-
moving too many children as a way to overcompensate in re-
sponse to a child’s death.11 It would also bring some standards 
that predate Gault—the family court’s authority in some states 
to dismiss a case “for social reasons”12—into a more modern 
administrative-law framework. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the rele-
vant academic literature regarding prosecutorial discretion in 
family court, the role of criminal prosecutors, and the role of law-
yers for government agencies. Part II explores the history of 
family-court prosecutors and intake decisions, from the origins of 
the family court through Gault and the post-Gault evolution of 
family-court prosecutors, and identifies the absence of consistent 
theoretical underpinnings of that role. Part III surveys current 
law and identifies significant variations across jurisdictions, re-
garding both who employs family-court prosecutors and their 
power as compared with juvenile justice and child protection 
agencies. Part IV argues why family-court prosecutors should 
represent and be employed by agencies rather than prosecutors’ 
offices, explores how an agency model can lead to judicial review 
of charging decisions, and addresses concerns that may be raised 
about an agency model. 
I.  FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION 
Family-court prosecutors have received remarkably little ex-
amination, from the emergence of such prosecutors in the years 
after Gault (a period discussed in detail in Part II) to the variety 
 
 11 See, for example, Martin Guggenheim, Book Review, Somebody’s Children: 
Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 Harv L Rev 1716, 1725–26 
(2000). See also Jill Lepore, Baby Doe: A Political History of Tragedy (New Yorker, Feb 1, 
2016), online at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/01/baby-doe (visited Dec 
15, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the “policy pendulum” that swings be-
tween family preservation and removal, especially after child deaths). 
 12 See text accompanying note 365. 
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of current statutory structures defining these prosecutors’ role 
(detailed in Part III). This Part explains the topic’s importance 
and places it in a broader context. While there has been little 
study of family-court prosecutors, there is a significant literature 
about the specific importance of family-court intake decisions, 
and more generally about how the government chooses when and 
how to file litigation. 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion in Family Court 
Determining which delinquency and child protection cases to 
prosecute, and which to handle through a variety of other means, 
is an essential feature of both our delinquency and child protec-
tion systems, and is arguably the “most critical stage.”13 That de-
cision determines which children can be removed from their fam-
ilies and placed in state custody. This Section establishes the 
tremendous importance of those decisions, known in family-court 
jargon as “intake.” 
1. Juvenile delinquency intake decisions. 
The juvenile delinquency system has long featured intake de-
cisions intended to review all cases to determine both their legal 
sufficiency and whether prosecution would serve the juvenile jus-
tice system’s rehabilitative goals.14 The decision when to use di-
version programs and when to prosecute children has been an es-
sential feature of the juvenile justice system since diversion 
programs were established soon after its inception.15 Prosecution, 
of course, requires a trial or plea, and an adjudication requires a 
judge to determine that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
proves the child’s guilt.16 Only such a finding can justify commit-
ting a child to a juvenile justice agency, requiring a child to com-
ply with probation conditions, or imposing the various collateral 
 
 13 Matter of Reis, 7 Crim L Rptr (BNA) 2151, 2152 (RI Fam 1970). Family-court pros-
ecutors make a range of other crucial decisions. In juvenile delinquency cases, these in-
clude whether to seek to detain children pretrial, what specific charges to file, whether to 
seek waiver of more serious charges, and which dispositions to recommend. In child pro-
tection cases, these include whether to seek pretrial removal or foster care of a child, what 
specific forms of abuse or neglect to allege, and which dispositions to recommend. I focus 
on the charging decision both for simplicity and for its decisive importance. 
 14 See, for example, Wallace Waalkes, Juvenile Court Intake—a Unique and 
Valuable Tool, 10 Crime & Delinq 117, 119–20 (1964), cited in William H. Sheridan, 
Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts 53 (Children’s Bureau 1966). 
 15 See text accompanying notes 84–90. 
 16 See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 367–68 (1970). 
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consequences of a juvenile conviction on a child.17 Diversion pro-
grams, in contrast, provide some kind of intervention short of 
court action.18 There is thus no trial, no conviction, no risk of de-
tention, less stigma imposed, and none of the collateral conse-
quences that flow from a conviction, and diversion therefore gen-
erally “is considered more desirable for youth.”19 It is a less 
expensive intervention than prosecution, and thus also provides 
benefits to the state.20 
Choosing diversion rather than prosecution is a central fea-
ture of the juvenile justice system. Nationally, in 2013, authori-
ties prosecuted a slight majority—55 percent—of all delinquency 
cases referred to family court.21 Authorities referred children to 
some kind of diversion program for 27 percent of cases, while 18 
percent were dismissed.22 During the 1990s, when a variety of 
tough-on-crime reforms occurred, the proportion of prosecutions 
spiked about 10 percent and then leveled off at its current rate.23 
But scholars have not closely examined how evolving family-court 
intake decisionmaking structures—especially the increasing au-
thority of prosecutors—have shaped this trend.24 
The decision whether to divert a case also has long-term im-
portance to achieving the juvenile delinquency system’s goal of 
 
 17 For a list of common collateral consequences, see South Carolina Commission on 
Indigent Defense, The South Carolina Juvenile Collateral Consequences Checklist *2–3 
(Aug 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/6WLL-DHRE. 
 18 The precise definition of “diversion” remains contested. Professor Daniel P. Mears, 
for instance, offers four possible definitions. See Daniel P. Mears, The Front End of 
Juvenile Court: Intake and Informal versus Formal Processing, in Donna M. Bishop and 
Barry C. Feld, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice 573, 594 
(Oxford 2011). I use the term consistent with Mears’s third definition, as “any effort aimed 
at ensuring that less serious cases are turned away from the juvenile justice system to 
receive services or treatment from some other agency or organization,” which Mears de-
scribed as “provid[ing] the clearest foothold for describing” diversion. Id. 
 19 US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the St. Louis 
County Family Court *44 (July 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/QY68-N733. But see 
Tamar R. Birckhead, Closing the Widening Net: The Rights of Juveniles at Intake, 46 Tex 
Tech L Rev 157, 163–64 (2013) (listing critiques of diversion). 
 20 See Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 163 (cited in note 19). 
 21 US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2013 *3–4 (Oct 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C9GX-44GY. 
 22 See id. 
 23 See text accompanying notes 187–91. 
 24 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18) (“[F]ew stud-
ies have examined whether greater prosecutorial involvement at intake changes how 
youth are processed.”). 
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rehabilitating youth and reducing future crime. Although the ev-
idence does not make a definitive case, the National Research 
Council concluded in 2015 that there is “a small, and somewhat 
inconsistent, negative effect [on recidivism] from juvenile justice 
system processing compared with diversion at the point of initial 
referral.”25 That is, prosecuting rather than diverting a child may 
lead to increased recidivism over time. A more recent study found 
that decisions to prosecute children for their first offense are “as-
sociated with higher levels of re-offending, particularly for less 
serious first offenses.”26 Decisions to prosecute children may also 
impose other significant harms. Professor Gary Sweeten found 
that “first-time official intervention during high school, particu-
larly court appearance, increases the odds of high school dropout 
by at least a factor of three.”27 
Juvenile delinquency intake decisions exacerbate racial dis-
parities in the juvenile justice system. Nationally, black children 
are more than 2.4 times as likely as white children to be referred 
to family court.28 That high rate of disproportionality makes ar-
rest and referral “the decision that is most significant to the total 
level of disproportionality.”29 Racial disparities are particularly 
evident in lower-level offenses—which are more likely to be on the 
margins of decisions to prosecute. Professor Kristin Henning has 
 
 25 Richard J. Bonnie, et al, eds, Reforming Juvenile Justice: A Developmental 
Approach 150 (National Academies 2013). 
 26 David E. Barrett and Antonis Katsiyannis, The Clemson Juvenile Delinquency 
Project: Major Findings from a Multi-agency Study, 26 J Child & Fam Stud 2050, 2051 
(2017). The study found one exception to this finding: youth who were “diagnosed with an 
aggression-related mental disorder.” Id at 2051–52. 
 27 Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by 
Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 Just Q 462, 463, 474 (2006) (emphasis added). 
Sweeten found that an arrest—even without a court appearance—reduces the likelihood 
of high school graduation, and an arrest followed by a decision to prosecute reduces that 
likelihood significantly more. “Put another way, first-time arrest during high school 
nearly doubles the odds of high school dropout, while a court appearance nearly quad-
ruples the odds of dropout.” Id at 473. See also id at 463, 466 (noting earlier research 
reaching similar conclusions). 
 28 A 2015 DOJ investigation reported that black children nationally are 2.4 times as 
likely to be referred to family court. Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at 
*39–40 (cited in note 19). This racial gap is even larger in some urban areas—black chil-
dren are 4.8 times as likely to be referred to family court than white children in counties 
deemed to be peers of St. Louis County (based on population size, poverty levels, popula-
tion density, and other factors). Id. 
 29 Sarah E. Redfield and Jason P. Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary 
Report *43 (ABA, Feb 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/K8WF-PFEA. Professors Sarah 
E. Redfield and Jason P. Nance add that the relative arrest rate by race has remained 
fairly stable since 1990. Id at *44. 
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shown how children of color are particularly vulnerable to prose-
cution for low-level offenses.30 South Carolina statistics for one 
such offense illustrate the point. Black children account for 33 
percent of all South Carolina children31 but nearly 60 percent of 
all children referred to South Carolina family court in delin-
quency cases.32 The disparities are even more stark for the misde-
meanor charge of disturbing schools—the crime of “interfer[ing] 
with or [ ] disturb[ing] in any way or in any place the students or 
teachers of any school”33—which consistently ranks among the top 
two or three most frequent family-court referrals;34 76 percent of 
all children referred to South Carolina family court between 2006 
and 2009 (the most recent years for which public data are availa-
ble) were black.35 Other research has demonstrated that these 
stark disparities cannot be explained by different school behav-
iors by different groups,36 nor can disparities throughout the sys-
tem be explained by different patterns of offending by children of 
different races.37 Although racial disparities are nothing new, 
some evidence suggests they have grown larger as prosecutors 
have diverted a smaller proportion of cases. Between 1980 and 
2000—during which prosecution became more common than di-
version—the likelihood of facing an arrest and charge rose by a 
particularly large amount for black boys.38 
 
 30 See generally Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev 383 (cited in note 10). National data for 
arrests and court referrals often do not track Latino children separately. Racial dispari-
ties, especially in detention and waiver decisions, have been well documented for Latino 
and American Indian children. See, for example, id at 409–10. 
 31 Children under 18 Years of Age by Race/Ethnicity (KidsCount Data Center), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/ER39-8TM8. 
 32 In 2014–2015, the figure was 59 percent. South Carolina Department of Juvenile 
Justice, 2015 County Datasheets, archived at http://perma.cc/VA69-FH34. 
 33 SC Code Ann § 16-17-420(A)–(B). 
 34 For instance, in 2014–2015, disturbing schools was the second most frequent 
charge referred to family court, accounting for 1,222 cases. See South Carolina 
Department of Juvenile Justice, 2014–2015 Annual Statistical Report *13–14 (2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/BA8Q-MBGK. 
 35 South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice, Disturbing Schools Data: FY 
2008–2009, online at http://www.state.sc.us/djj/2010%20disturbing%20schools 
%20presentation_files/frame.htm (visited Dec 15, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(Slide 3). 
 36 See Redfield and Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report at *15, 20–
21 (cited in note 29). 
 37 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 411–15 (cited in note 10). 
 38 See Tia Stevens and Merry Morash, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Boys’ Probability 
of Arrest and Court Actions in 1980 and 2000: The Disproportionate Impact of “Getting 
Tough” on Crime, 13 Youth Violence & Juv Just 77, 88 (2015). 
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The decision about how to handle those referrals—dismiss, 
divert, or prosecute—could provide an important mechanism for 
reducing disparities within the juvenile justice system. However, 
this decision increases racial disparities—black children are 0.7 
times as likely to have their cases diverted as white children.39 
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) has investigated several ju-
risdictions for a pattern and practice of racial discrimination and 
found that, even controlling for variables like the specific charges 
and criminal history, authorities were significantly more likely to 
prosecute black children than white children.40 And the DOJ has 
made the expansion of diversion programs41 and the assessment 
and remedy of racial disparities in the decision to divert or pros-
ecute into essential pieces of proposed remedies for such discrim-
ination.42 Short of federal investigations, however, academic com-
mentators have bemoaned how race-neutral procedural rights 
provided to juvenile defendants “imposed no real check on the dis-
criminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”43 
2. Child protection intake decisions. 
Child protection cases similarly feature important discretion 
at their early stages. Such cases typically begin with a report to a 
child protection agency alleging that a parent or caregiver has 
abused or neglected a child. Child protection agencies investigate 
allegations of abuse or neglect, but an agency determination that 
 
 39 Redfield and Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report at *43 (cited in 
note 29). See also Donna M. Bishop and Michael J. Leiber, Racial and Ethnic Differences 
in Delinquency and Justice System Reponses, in Bishop and Feld, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice 445, 447–51 (cited in note 18) (noting 
that 62 percent of black youth referred to family court are prosecuted, compared with 58 
percent of nonblack youth and 53 percent of white youth). The size of that disparity de-
creased slightly between 1990 and 2010. National Center for Juvenile Justice, Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2014 
National Report *178 (Dec 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XA3T-U372. 
 40 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *43 (cited in note 19) 
(finding in St. Louis County that “formal case handling [prosecution] occurs almost one-
and-a-half times more often for Black youth, after introducing the control variables”). See 
also US Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Shelby County 
Juvenile Court *32–35 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3YX2-2KJD (finding that in 
Shelby County, Tennessee, which contains Memphis, “the odds of Black children receiving 
a warning was one third less than the odds of White child[ren] receiving a warning even 
after accounting for other variables”). 
 41 See Investigation of the Shelby County Juvenile Court at *63–64 (cited in note 40). 
 42 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *55–56 (cited in note 19). 
 43 Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice 
Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 Harv CR–CL L Rev 511, 515 (2009). 
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maltreatment occurred only begins the analysis. Agencies can 
then file a case, work with families without initiating court ac-
tion,44 or do nothing at all.45 The second option is akin to diversion 
in delinquency cases—officials work with a family on a techni-
cally voluntary basis, but with the threat (implied or otherwise) 
of filing court action if the family does not cooperate. 
This type of child protection diversion happens in a large ma-
jority of cases. In fiscal year 2014, state child protection agencies 
deemed 702,208 children to be abuse and neglect victims.46 But 
only 26 percent of children deemed victims by state child protec-
tion agencies were the subject of court action, and only 23 percent 
of children deemed victims were placed in foster care.47 States pro-
vided services to 63.7 percent of children deemed victims, essen-
tially diverting those families, and did nothing with the remain-
der.48 As with juvenile delinquency, significant racial 
disparities exist; state child protection agencies deemed 15.3 
out of every 1,000 black children to be abused or maltreated, 
compared to rates of 8.8 for Hispanic, 8.4 for white, and 1.7 for 
Asian children.49 
Expanding such diversion decisions has been a hallmark of 
child protection reforms in the twenty-first century, with the in-
tention of reducing the number of children removed from families 
and placed in state custody. New York City’s experience is illus-
trative. From 2002 to 2013, New York City cut its foster care pop-
ulation by about half,50 a drop driven significantly by a decrease 
 
 44 This observation is simplified. Working with a family without initiating a court 
case can include referring the family for some kind of service, more intensive supervision 
by a child protection agency, or even requesting—with an implied threat of court action if 
the parent refuses—that the parent agrees to a “safety plan,” which can include changing 
the child’s physical custody. 
 45 An agency may do nothing if the risk of future maltreatment is removed. If, for 
instance, one adult abuses a child and a parent obtains a restraining order against that 
adult, no further agency action is necessary to protect the child from future abuse. 
 46 US Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s Bureau, Child 
Maltreatment 2014 *21 (2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6D4-9BPE. 
 47 Id at *84–85. 
 48 Id at *80, 83. 
 49 Id at *41. For a summary of recent racial disproportionality data and debates in 
child protection law, see generally Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster 
Care: The National Debate, 97 Marq L Rev 215 (2013). 
 50 See Allon Yaroni, et al, Innovations in NYC Health and Human Services Policy: 
Child Welfare Policy *1 (Vera Institute of Justice 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/VCW7-RTV8. 
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in new placements in foster care.51 That drop roughly coincided 
with a 25 percent increase in the number of children receiving 
“preventive services” in their homes from 2000 to 2010.52 A less 
dramatic, but similar, trend has occurred nationally, with remov-
als of children from their families and placement into foster care 
dropping approximately 13 percent from 2005 to 2014,53 although 
removals have increased slightly in recent years,54 perhaps in re-
sponse to the opioid epidemic.55 
As the difference between New York City’s experience and 
the national average suggests, national statistics mask tremen-
dous state-by-state variation in the results of child protection 
prosecutorial discretion. The percentage of child victims to whom 
jurisdictions provide services ranges from 23.3 to 100 percent.56 
The percentage for whom court cases are filed ranges from the 
single digits to nearly two-thirds.57 Plainly, diversion is a promi-
nent feature in most, if not all, state child protection systems, but 
states differ significantly in how they determine which cases to 
divert and which to prosecute. 
 
 51 New foster care placements in New York City dropped from 6,560 in 2003 to 4,179 
in 2013. Compare Foster Care Placements: Number; 2003 (Citizens’ Committee for Children), 
archived at http://perma.cc/N49Z-EWNA, with Foster Care Placements, Number; 2013 
(Citizens’ Committee for Children), archived at http://perma.cc/HX6X-XEUP. 
 52 Yaroni, et al, Innovations in NYC Health and Human Services Policy at *4 (cited 
in note 50). 
 53 US Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s Bureau, Trends in Fos-
ter Care and Adoption: FY 2005–FY 2014 *1–2 (July 9, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GTT4-W39C. 
 54 Annual removals hit a low of 251,354 in fiscal year 2012, and have increased to 
269,509 in FY 2015. See US Department of Health and Human Services, Children’s 
Bureau, The AFCARS Report: Preliminary FY 2015 Estimates as of June 2016 *1 (June 
30, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M6PC-2B4H. The most recent removal numbers re-
main below those of the early 2000s; for instance, 307,000 children were removed into 
foster care in 2005. See Trends in Foster Care and Adoption, FY 2005–FY 2014 at *1 (cited 
in note 53). 
 55 See Teresa Wiltz, Drug-Addiction Epidemic Creates Crisis in Foster Care (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, Oct 7, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/F72P-BG2M. 
 56 See Child Maltreatment 2014 at *83 (cited in note 46) (reporting that in the 
District of Columbia, 23.3 percent of victims received postresponse services in 2014, while 
100 percent of victims in Tennessee received postresponse services). 
 57 See id at *85 (reflecting that court action was initiated in 2014 in Maine for 
2.9 percent of victims while 64.6 percent of Montana victims had a corresponding 
court action). 
2018] Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors 757 
 
B. Criminal Prosecutors’ Power 
Academics widely view criminal prosecutors’ power as an es-
sential point of study for understanding the criminal justice sys-
tem, focusing especially on prosecutors’ charging discretion. Pros-
ecutors are the “Leviathan” in our criminal justice system—
effectively investigating individuals and determining their guilt 
and punishment by exercising their charging discretion and lev-
eraging guilty pleas through the threat of harsh sentences for de-
fendants who do not so plead.58 Criminal prosecutors’ power is “a 
glaring and dangerous exception” to normal separation-of-powers 
principles because they largely exercise this power without sig-
nificant checks from other branches of government.59 As a result, 
prosecutors’ power is viewed as a contributing factor, if not a 
prime cause, of mass incarceration.60 Relatedly, prosecutors’ 
power is viewed as “a major cause of racial inequality in the crim-
inal justice system,” and reforming how prosecutors use that 
power may be an important tool to addressing those inequalities.61 
Much less focus has been placed on family-court prosecutors. 
The role of juvenile delinquency prosecutors has gained some at-
tention in studies evaluating which cases ought to be prosecuted 
at all62 and, among those cases, which ought to be waived63 for 
criminal prosecution as adults. But the role, structure, and checks 
and balances on family-court prosecutors have largely escaped ac-
ademic attention in both delinquency and child protection cases. 
In particular, there has not been significant exploration of how 
 
 58 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan L Rev 869, 874–87 (2009). Professor Rachel E. 
Barkow also aptly summarizes generations of critiques of prosecutorial power and the ab-
sence of checks on it. See, for example, id at 874 n 16 (collecting sources critiquing the 
“expansion of federal criminal law”). See also John F. Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of 
Mass Incarceration—and How to Achieve Real Reform 127 (Basic Books 2017) (“Few peo-
ple in the criminal justice system are as powerful, or as central to prison growth, as the 
prosecutor.”); Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor 8 
n 16 (Oxford 2007) (collecting sources critiquing prosecutorial power). 
 59 Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 871 (cited in note 58). 
 60 Pfaff, Locked In at 127–59 (cited in note 58). 
 61 See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 
67 Fordham L Rev 13, 17–19, 50–53 (1998). 
 62 See generally, for example, Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev 383 (cited in note 10); 
Cynthia Godsoe, Recasting Vagueness: The Case of Teen Sex Statutes, 74 Wash & Lee L 
Rev 173 (2017); Mary Willis, Utilizing Prosecutorial Discretion to Reduce the Number of 
Juveniles with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System, 2016 BYU Educ & L J 191. 
 63 See generally, for example, Donna M. Bishop and Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of 
Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 Notre 
Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol 281 (1991). 
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delinquency or child protection prosecutors determine which 
cases to file and which to divert or dismiss, whether their power 
should be checked, and if so, how. 
This Article thus fills a critical gap in the literature. Placing 
juvenile delinquency and child protection prosecutorial authority 
in elected prosecutors’ offices has not been thoroughly examined 
or challenged. Nor has the role of administrative agencies in ex-
ercising family-court prosecutorial discretion been scrutinized. 
This gap is particularly striking in light of literature bemoan-
ing the absence of sufficient checks on criminal prosecutors’ au-
thority and articulating how administrative-law principles might 
play a helpful role. Professor Rachel Barkow has argued that 
some administrative-law principles regarding the internal struc-
ture of government offices can help check prosecutorial power.64 
Even that suggestion is premised on the conclusion that courts 
and policymakers will not impose meaningful external checks on 
prosecutorial power.65 This Article argues that this pessimistic 
conclusion need not apply to family-court prosecutors if the law 
recognizes the essential role of agencies and empowers judges to 
review agency balancing of the competing goals of our juvenile 
justice and child protection system.66 
C. Agency Counsel versus Centralized Prosecutorial Control 
Administrative agencies’ central role in both the juvenile jus-
tice and child protection systems makes another body of literature 
important—scholarship exploring the role of executive-branch 
lawyers in exercising prosecutorial discretion in a wide range of 
civil and criminal areas of law. Most of this literature has focused 
on the federal government, addressing the DOJ’s widespread 
(though not universal) control over federal agency litigation and 
analyzing the role of both agency and DOJ attorneys.67 Scholars 
 
 64 See Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 887–906 (cited in note 58). 
 65 See id at 908 (“[Judicial oversight] is too costly, too inefficient, and not sufficiently 
deferential to what are perceived to be experts in the field.”). Professor Angela J. Davis 
has worked from a similar premise, proposing the collection and publication of detailed 
data on prosecutors’ decisions by race of defendants and crime victims as a means to “help 
prosecutors make informed decisions about the formulation of policies and establish stand-
ards to guide the exercise of discretion in specific cases.” See Davis, 67 Fordham L Rev at 
19 (cited in note 61). 
 66 See Part IV.C. 
 67 See generally, for example, Neal Devins and Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for 
Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U Pa J Const L 558 (2002); David 
Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 Yale L J 616 (2013). 
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have noted that “we seem hardly to have considered” questions of 
how to hold government agencies accountable in determining 
when and how to use their enforcement authority.68 Some recent 
literature has explored these themes at the state level, exploring 
the role of state attorneys general in high-profile cases,69 and of 
state agency general counsels.70 
Both sets of literature note that most agency lawyers do not 
litigate on behalf of their agency clients—especially because the 
litigation role is taken by lawyers from DOJ or a state attorney 
general’s office—but that, nonetheless, many carveouts for 
agency litigation authority exist in both state and federal govern-
ments.71 And, relatedly, some scholarship has criticized grants of 
litigation authority to the DOJ and argued for shifting that au-
thority to agencies.72 
I am aware of no study that has connected these themes to 
state family-court litigation—even though the litigation carve-
outs for some states’ child protection agencies account for thou-
sands of cases annually. Moreover, no study has connected these 




 68 Margaret H. Lemos, Accountability and Independence in Public Enforcement *3 
(Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No 2016-23, Mar 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8X88-JLFG. 
 69 See generally, for example, Neal Devins and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty 
States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 Yale L J 
2100 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos and Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests: Attorneys 
General as Amici, 90 NYU L Rev 1229 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 Harv L Rev 486 (2012). 
 70 See generally, for example, Elizabeth Chambliss and Dana Remus, Nothing Could 
Be Finer?: The Role of Agency General Counsel in North and South Carolina, 84 Fordham 
L Rev 2039 (2016). 
 71 See id at 2049 (“[S]pecialized carve-outs grant some agencies and commissions au-
thority to litigate some types of matters on their own behalf.”); Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J 
Const L at 561 (cited in note 67) (noting “approximately three-dozen” federal agency liti-
gation carveouts that have “significantly eroded” DOJ’s control over federal litigation); 
Neal Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent Agencies, 
in Cornell W. Clayton, ed, Government Lawyers: The Federal Legal Bureaucracy and 
Presidential Politics 181, 184–89 (Kansas 1995) (providing a primer on federal agency lit-
igation control). 
 72 See, for example, Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 570–94 (cited in note 67). 
 73 Some studies have discussed the importance of DOJ control over federal criminal 
prosecutions. See id at 561–62. The grounds for this centralized DOJ control differ signif-
icantly when applied to state juvenile delinquency prosecutions. See text accompanying 
notes 398–403. 
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II.  HISTORY OF FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS: IGNORED AT THE 
ORIGINS, REQUIRED BY POST-GAULT REFORMS 
At its origins, all functions of the family court—including 
charging discretion in both delinquency and child protection 
cases—rested in the court itself. The present role of family-court 
prosecutors evolved following the family court’s “constitutional 
domestication” that the Supreme Court required in Gault.74 Those 
reforms shifted charging decisions away from the family court, 
but did so without a cohesive or consistent structure for the enti-
ties that took over this authority. In juvenile delinquency cases, 
elected prosecutors took on this essential authority without much 
critical consideration of whether they were best suited for the job 
or how their power should interact with intake officers. In child 
protection cases, jurisdictions split over whether state agencies or 
elected prosecutors should have this essential power, also without 
much critical consideration. In neither field did reforms lead to a 
consistent set of structures or, more importantly, to structures 
justified by delinquency and child protection law’s rehabilitative 
mission. 
This Part traces the evolution of the modern family-court 
prosecutor in both child protection and juvenile delinquency 
cases, which involved shifts along four planes. First, the family 
court evolved from a relatively lawyerless system at its origins to 
one with lawyers representing both the state and individuals. 
Second, charging authority largely shifted away from court staff 
and to executive-branch officials. Here, child protection cases and 
delinquency cases followed different paths—child protection 
agencies obtained a relatively greater degree of control over in-
take decisions, while prosecutors, without agency clients, became 
the dominant players in delinquency cases. Neither field devel-
oped consistent structures across jurisdictions, and problematic 
vestiges of the original structure remain, as Part III.C docu-
ments. Third, the growth of the administrative state shaped pros-
ecutorial discretion. Comprehensive child protection agencies be-
came common by the 1970s, and these agencies became obvious 
candidates in which prosecutorial authority ought to reside. The 
juvenile justice administrative state was more varied; in some 
states, juvenile justice agencies were involved from the begin-
nings to the ends of cases and thus had a role in charging deci-
sions (even if it was secondary to the role of prosecutors). In other 
 
 74 Gault, 387 US at 22. 
2018] Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors 761 
 
states, juvenile justice agencies’ roles were limited to supervising 
children only after they were found guilty, with intake staff (often 
employed by courts) continuing to play a role at the beginning of 
cases. 
The fourth, and perhaps most dramatic, shift is the evolution 
of prosecutors—at least in delinquency cases—into a tool of 
tough-on-crime reforms. Intake decisions were historically 
viewed as essential elements of family courts’ rehabilitative pur-
pose, with “judicious nonintervention” a hallmark of the system.75 
The system historically avoided prosecutors for fear they would 
apply a more punitive purpose, and even in the years following 
Gault, leading commentators saw prosecutors as inheritors of 
family courts’ rehabilitative goals. Delinquency prosecutors’ role 
shifted, however, in the 1980s and 1990s, as they used their rela-
tively new intake authority to increase the proportion of cases 
prosecuted. 
A. Pre-Gault Procedure 
The problematic structure of the early family court frames 
the development of family-court prosecutors through the present. 
Intake decisions were essential to family courts from an early 
point in their history. Family courts, however, were wary of 
elected prosecutors as unlikely to follow the court’s rehabilitative 
purpose, so court staff would decide what cases to prosecute and 
prosecute them. In avoiding prosecutors (and many other due pro-
cess protections, including lawyers for children or parents), this 
system created a range of constitutional problems. 
1. No prosecutors and not much due process. 
From family courts’ origin at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury to the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Gault, family courts 
had developed a unique system for making charging decisions in 
both child protection and juvenile delinquency cases, which 
placed court staff in decisive roles and excluded prosecutors and 
other executive-branch officials. 
The very early family court permitted private citizens to file 
petitions alleging that a child was neglected or delinquent, and 
held hearings regarding any child who was the subject of any 
citizen’s complaint. The first juvenile-court statute—enacted by 
 
 75 See text accompanying note 86. 
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Illinois in 1899—provided that “[a]ny reputable person,  . . . hav-
ing knowledge of a child in his county who appears to be either 
neglected, dependent or delinquent, may file . . . a petition,” which 
would automatically trigger a summons and a hearing.76 The stat-
ute contained neither references to any role for prosecutors nor 
any procedure to screen out petitions that did not warrant prose-
cution. Publications from the 1920s—after nearly every state had 
established some kind of juvenile court—illustrate similar proce-
dures around the country.77 There was no role for any executive-
branch entity until cases reached disposition, when the juvenile 
court could, as in Illinois, send neglected children to “some suita-
ble State institution” or delinquent children to “training schools” 
or “industrial schools” (these various institutions would be subject 
to some state oversight).78 
Early family-court leaders were clear that prosecutors ought 
not have a role because that would threaten the court’s rehabili-
tative purpose. Assigning to district attorneys the responsibility 
of filing petitions, “of course, savors too much of a prosecution and 
is practised as an expedient only in small or rural communities” 
without family-court staff.79 The federal Children’s Bureau opined 
that referring cases to local district attorneys’ offices was “[c]on-
trary to generally approved practice in juvenile-court work.”80 The 
best procedure, it was thought, was for members of the commu-
nity, such as parents, to file juvenile charges.81 In practice, the 
source of court complaints varied—with police complaints domi-
nating in some cities, and parent, school, or other referrals being 
a larger force in others.82 
 
 76 Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 §§ 4–5, reprinted in 49 Juv & Fam Ct J 1, 2 
(Fall 1998). Notably, cases involving children who were allegedly “neglected, dependent 
[and] delinquent” were addressed in the same statute. 
 77 See, for example, Herbert H. Lou, 5 Juvenile Courts in the United States 99 (North 
Carolina 1927). 
 78 See Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 §§ 7, 9, 13, reprinted in 49 Juv & Fam Ct J 
at 2–4 (cited in note 76). 
 79 Lou, 5 Juvenile Courts in the United States at 100 (cited in note 77). A study of ten 
urban court systems found only one with any prosecutorial involvement. See Katharine F. 
Lenroot and Emma O. Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work: A Study of the Organization 
and Methods of Ten Courts 39–51 (Government Printing Office 1925) (reporting that, in 
Los Angeles, “[c]ontrary to generally approved practice in juvenile-court work, those cases 
in which the juvenile bureau deemed court action necessary were reported by that bureau 
not to the juvenile court but to the office of the district attorney”). 
 80 Lenroot and Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work at 47 (cited in note 79). 
 81 See id at 51. 
 82 See id at 40. 
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Relatively quickly, the number of complaints required court-
employed probation or intake officers to determine which to pros-
ecute and which to divert or dismiss. The 1899 Illinois statute 
charged the court with appointing juvenile probation officers who 
would investigate cases, “represent the interests of the child,” and 
otherwise “furnish to the court such information and assistance 
as the judge may require.”83 Faced with growing delinquency 
dockets and recognizing that not all children subject to private 
individuals’ petitions needed court intervention, by the 1920s, 
court staff began deciding which cases could be dismissed and 
which prosecuted.84 
Frequent use of diversion was essential. Authorities recom-
mended that family-court probation officers not pursue formal 
charges and instead seek diversion—then called informal adjust-
ment—“whenever feasible.”85 As a later federal commission wrote, 
hearing delinquency cases in a separate court from criminal cases 
depended on a more rehabilitative emphasis at intake: “If there 
is a defensible philosophy for the juvenile court it is one of judi-
cious nonintervention.”86 Juvenile probation or intake officers 
soon exercised that authority around the country, investigating 
complaints that a child was delinquent or neglected and deter-
mining if they would file a petition.87 Actual practices varied sub-
stantially—both in the number of cases informally adjusted and 
in the procedures used for such adjustments.88 
These changes left the family-court probation officers operat-
ing as a “quasi-social welfare agency” decades before the modern 
 
 83 Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 § 6, reprinted in 49 Juv & Fam Ct J at 2 (cited 
in note 76). 
 84 See H. Ted Rubin, The Emerging Prosecutor Dominance of the Juvenile Court 
Intake Process, 26 Crime & Delinq 299, 301 (1980). See also Lou, Juvenile Courts in the 
United States at 223 (cited in note 77). Lou reported on the Juvenile Court Standards 
adopted in 1923 by a committee appointed by the US Children’s Bureau. Id at 221. 
 85 Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States at 224 (cited in note 77). Legislative 
reforms calling for “informal adjustments” noted their “great[ ] significance” to improved 
intake decisions. Noah Weinstein, The Juvenile Court Concept in Missouri: Its Historical 
Development—the Need for New Legislation, 1957 Wash U L Q 17, 38. 
 86 Edwin M. Lemert, The Juvenile Court—Quest and Realities, in President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 91, 96 (Government Printing Office 1967). 
 87 See The Administration of Juvenile Justice—the Juvenile Court and Related 
Methods of Delinquency Control, in Task Force Report 1, 5 (cited in note 86). 
 88 See Lenroot and Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work at 109–14 (cited in note 79). In 
some cities, court staff declined to file formal charges in three-quarters of complaints, while 
in others court staff informally adjusted only around two-fifths of complaints. Id at 111. 
764 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:743 
 
administrative state developed.89 Court staff would identify indi-
viduals and families who they believed would benefit from the 
court’s services and provide them—either by court order, if they 
prosecuted a case, or without one, if they diverted it. The proce-
dure in child protection cases was contemporaneously described 
in agency terms: “The probation department is an agency of the 
court. It is thus the court’s agent who works with the family after 
the initial complaint. Most often, it is the court’s agent who files 
the neglect petition.”90 
Similarly, family-court leaders believed that emphasizing di-
version in delinquency cases required keeping elected prosecutors 
away from family court. Family-court observers explicitly distin-
guished court-staff control from elected-prosecutor control in the 
criminal system.91 Excluding prosecutors from charging decisions 
remained essential to ensure charging authority rested with 
these officials who would promote rehabilitative goals.92 
The unique nature and importance of this rehabilitation-
focused intake structure filtered up to the Supreme Court’s later 
decisions about juvenile law. Justice Byron White noted it as one 
ground for denying children the right to a jury trial in McKeiver 
v Pennsylvania.93 In adult cases, juries serve as “a buffer to the 
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor.”94 But “the distinctive intake 
 
 89 Douglas E. Abrams, A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice 
in Missouri 138 (Missouri Juvenile Justice Association 2003). See also Leslie J. Harris, 
Rethinking the Relationship between Juvenile Courts and Treatment Agencies—an 
Administrative Law Approach, 28 J Fam L 217, 257–58 (1989). 
 90 Patrick T. Murphy, NLADA Juvenile Court Project, 27 Legal Aid Briefcase 224, 
225–26 (1969). 
 91 See Margaret K. Rosenheim and Daniel L. Skoler, The Lawyer’s Role at Intake and 
Detention Stages of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 Crime & Delinq 167, 168–69 (1965) 
(“[I]ntake in the juvenile court is, for the most part, conducted by social work staff as op-
posed to the participation of lawyers or judicial officers in criminal cases.”). See also The 
Administration of Juvenile Justice at 15 (cited in note 87) (explaining that “[n]either de-
fense attorney nor prosecutor regularly appears” in any intake meeting or hearing, and 
that during “the juvenile court intake process there is nothing comparable to the key role 
played by the prosecutor in criminal cases during bargaining for dismissal or lesser 
charges”). 
 92 For instance, 1957 Missouri legislation prevented prosecutors from initiating 
charges to keep a “vestige of criminal procedure” out of family court. Weinstein, 1957 Wash 
U L Q at 38 (cited in note 85). 
 93 403 US 528 (1971). The Supreme Court decided McKeiver four years after Gault, 
but the role of prosecutors had not yet evolved fully and White appears to have had a 
traditional family-court intake officer role in mind. 
 94 Id at 552 (White concurring). 
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policies and procedures of the juvenile court system to a great ex-
tent obviate this important function of the jury.”95 
2. Structural problems. 
However insightful the insistence on separating criminal 
prosecutors may have been from a rehabilitative process, the 
early family-court intake structure had severe separation-of-
powers and due process problems. The officials determining 
which cases to prosecute were judicial-branch staff answerable to 
the family-court judges who would rule on their petitions.96 In the 
years preceding Gault, various authorities criticized this struc-
ture, arguing that a “court through the use of its own staff should 
not be placed in the position of investigator and petitioner and 
also act as the tribunal deciding the validity of the allegations in 
the petition.”97 Compounding these problems, the same judicial-
branch officials who “made investigations and filed petitions” 
would attempt to “represent[ ] children and their interests in 
court,”98 thus depriving children and parents of advocates who 
would subject petitions against them to adversarial testing. 
 
 95 Id (White concurring). See also In re Winship, 397 US 358, 366–67 (1970) (noting 
“procedures distinctive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory 
hearing”). A split Court decided McKeiver, and White’s opinion, not the plurality’s, was 
decisive. Core features relied on by White—including the prosecutorial dominance of 
intake—have changed, but the Supreme Court has not revisited McKeiver. State supreme 
courts have considered more recent arguments that children should have a jury trial right, 
but they have largely followed McKeiver. See, for example, In re Stephen W., 761 SE2d 
231, 232 (SC 2014). But see In re L.M., 186 P3d 164, 170–71 (Kan 2008) (finding a state 
constitutional right to a juvenile jury trial but recognizing that most states have ruled 
otherwise). 
 96 See Rubin, 26 Crime & Delinq at 299 (cited in note 84) (“The values of the juvenile 
court judge, often the employer of probation personnel, have influenced these [charging] 
decisions.”). 
 97 Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 13 (cited in note 14). One 
court tried to justify this structure by arguing that “the juvenile court merely supervises 
the operation of court employees,” and those employees make decisions about whether to 
file charges in individual cases. In re Appeal in Pima County Anonymous, Juvenile Action, 
515 P2d 600, 604 (Ariz 1973). This distinction between “mere supervision” and individual 
case decisionmaking is weak, as supervision generally shaped how court staff make those 
individual decisions. See Matter of Reis, 7 Crim L Rptr (BNA) 2151, 2152 (RI Fam 1970); 
The Administration of Juvenile Justice at 9 n 31 (cited in note 87) (“[M]any discretionary 
judgments are made by court staff within explicit guidelines evolved by or with the juve-
nile court judge.”). 
 98 In the Matter of the Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action, 594 P2d 506, 508 
(Ariz 1979). 
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The Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Gault denounced 
the absence of due process in family-court trials and required dra-
matic reforms—“constitutional domestication.”99 Following a 
neighbor’s complaint about an alleged sexual prank call, a deputy 
probation officer filed a petition alleging that Gerald Gault was 
delinquent, but not alleging any specific facts.100 The probation 
officer then prosecuted Gault in Gila County, Arizona, family 
court, with no prosecutor present.101 Gault was not given notice of 
the specific charges against him, had no opportunity to confront 
or question the witness against him, was denied the ability to stay 
quiet in the face of government questioning, and was denied a 
lawyer to help him fight the charges against him.102 The Supreme 
Court famously decried these procedures, writing that “the condi-
tion of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”103 The Court 
held that the Constitution provided basic due process protections 
to children alleged to be delinquents—the right to notice, to con-
front witnesses, protection against self-incrimination, and, essen-
tially, counsel.104 
The prosecutorial discretion exercised in Gault illustrates 
that the family-court structure provided children with “the worst 
of both worlds: . . . neither the protections accorded to adults nor 
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for chil-
dren.”105 That “solicitous care” would seem to suggest that an in-
dividual exercising prosecutorial discretion would dismiss or di-
vert a case about a lewd prank phone call. Instead, the probation 
officer charged Gault, and the court committed him to the state 
industrial school.106 
Reflecting the family court’s historical linkage of delinquency 
and child protection jurisdiction, some of Gault’s dicta suggested 
that analogous due process concerns applied to child protection 
cases. The Court suggested concern both for Gault’s loss of 
physical liberty and for his separation from his parents—the core 
 
 99 Gault, 387 US at 22. 
 100 Id at 4–5. 
 101 See id at 5–6. 
 102 See id at 5–10. The charges were ripe for a challenge. Gault was charged with 
making a lewd telephone call to his neighbor, but the record was not clear whether Gault 
or a friend made any of the allegedly lewd statements. See id at 5–7. 
 103 Gault, 387 US at 28. 
 104 See id at 31–57. 
 105 Id at 18 n 23, quoting Kent v United States, 383 US 541, 556 (1966). 
 106 See Gault, 387 US at 4–5. 
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constitutional right at issue in child protection cases.107 When dis-
cussing the specific importance of notice, the Court stated that 
the Due Process Clause “does not allow a hearing to be held in 
which a youth’s freedom and his parents’ right to his custody are 
at stake” without adequate notice of the state’s specific allega-
tions.108 The absence of a clearer ruling on parental rights may 
have resulted from a litigation choice; Gault had argued to the 
Arizona courts that the juvenile court should not have “remove[d] 
Gerald from the custody of his parents without a showing and 
finding of their unsuitability,”109 but Gault’s lawyer did not raise 
this argument to the Supreme Court.110 Thus, Gault reflected the 
need for a family-court system that provided basic due process 
rights both to children in delinquency cases and, implicitly, to 
families in child protection cases, and Gault soon became a key 
impetus for reform of family-court procedures in both fields. 
B. Post-Gault Pressure to Reform 
Although Gault’s specific holdings addressed neither juvenile 
court intake111 nor child protection cases, its “constitutional do-
mestication”112 of the juvenile court nonetheless catalyzed reforms 
in both fields. Part II.B.1 discusses reform efforts in juvenile de-
linquency law, while Part II.B.2 details legal developments in 
child protection law. 
1. Pressures for reform in juvenile delinquency law. 
Gault indirectly113 caused reforms to family-court intake pro-
cedure. Gault suggested that basic constitutional protections 
would apply to family court, making the separation-of-powers 
 
 107 See id at 10 (noting Gault’s argument that he should not be removed from his 
parents without proof of their “unsuitability” and that he was “taken from the custody 
of his parents” unconstitutionally); id at 17 (describing family courts’ delinquency juris-
diction as being triggered by “parent[al] default in effectively performing their custodial 
functions”). 
 108 Id at 33–34. 
 109 Id at 10. 
 110 See Martin Guggenheim, Barry Feld: An Intellectual History of a Juvenile Court 
Reformer, 17 Nev L J 371, 375 (2017). 
 111 Gault, 387 US at 13. 
 112 Id at 22. 
 113 The Court did not explicitly address “the procedures or constitutional rights appli-
cable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process.” Id at 13. The Court recognized that 
such procedures were “unique to the juvenile process” and disclaimed any intent to change 
or even address them, thus enabling the Court to rebut criticism that Gault jeopardized 
what was different about family court. Id at 31 n 48. 
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problems in its intake structure hard to ignore. More practically, 
Gault’s requirement that states provide defense counsel for chil-
dren in delinquency cases114 resulted in an unsustainable situa-
tion. Court intake officers would now face defense attorneys with-
out having attorneys themselves—putting them “at a severe 
disadvantage.”115 When probation officers could engage effectively 
in an adversarial trial, their efforts would damage their efforts to 
build a relationship with the child and family necessary to provid-
ing rehabilitative services in the event of a conviction.116 
This uneven playing field pressured family-court judges to in-
tervene. Many appeared to take on the role of a prosecutor, in-
cluding examining both prosecution and defense witnesses.117 
Such events created obvious problems of judicial bias, contrary to 
the constitutional domestication that Gault directed.118 Judges 
confronted this problem,119 and complained about it. One promi-
nent New York City family-court judge, Justine Wise Polier, de-
scribed it this way: 
As a result of this situation, the Court is all too often required 
to question the complaining witnesses. . . . Such a procedure 
. . . places the Court in the untenable position of having to 
seek the facts on which a petition of delinquency is based, 
hear the defense, and then undertake to evaluate and pass 
on the evidence as a Judge.120 
The problem, Polier concluded, “calls for corrective legislation.”121 
 
 114 See id at 34–42. 
 115 Douglas J. Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court 39 
(Practising Law Institute 1974). 
 116 See Edwin M. Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis L Rev 
421, 434. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See Gault, 387 US at 40–41. See also M. Marvin Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in 
the Juvenile Courts: Guidelines for the Future 10 (DOJ 1973) (“[T]he assumption of prose-
cutorial roles by the probation staff or the juvenile court judge creates undesirable role 
conflicts.”). 
 119 See, for example, Lemert, 1967 Wis L Rev at 436 (cited in note 116) (quoting one 
judge who acknowledged the problematic role of helping to prosecute a child). 
 120 Matter of Lang, 255 NYS2d 987, 992 (Fam 1965). Polier addressed the situation 
created by New York’s pre-Gault statutory provision of counsel to juvenile defendants—a 
situation that Gault created nationally. See Note, The Juvenile Offender’s Procedural 
Rights in the New York Family Court, 41 St John’s L Rev 386, 392 (1967) (“[T]he judge 
may be thrown into a prosecutor’s state of mind by the presence of an advocate for the 
child, but none against him.”). 
 121 See Lang, 255 NYS2d at 991. 
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Judicial calls for reform were insufficiently granular, as they 
left to legislatures the task of defining the precise structure that 
new legislation should create. The challenge was illustrated in a 
1971 case in which the Rhode Island Family Court ruled that 
its intake structure—which had not been changed since 
Gault—violated due process for many of the reasons discussed in 
Part II.A.1. It held that the court “must be entirely independent 
of the investigative and accusatory process.”122 The court mused 
that intake authority “belongs somewhere else”—but did not de-
fine where that “somewhere else” should be or how it should ac-
commodate the increasing role both of lawyers for all parties and 
for administrative agencies.123 
2. Pressures for reform in child protection law. 
Gault implied concern with the rights of parents to maintain 
custody of their children,124 but it did not directly address child 
protection cases. There is no case equivalent to Gault in the child 
protection pantheon. Nonetheless, several legal developments 
contemporaneously created pressure for reform to family-court 
prosecutorial discretion in child protection cases. First, attorneys 
for parents and some kind of advocate for children became far 
more prevalent in child protection cases in the years after Gault. 
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act125 (CAPTA) re-
quired states to provide guardians ad litem for children as a con-
dition of receiving federal funding.126 The Supreme Court noted in 
1981 that “[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an 
indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel 
not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency 
and neglect proceedings as well.”127 
 
 122 See Reis, 7 Crim L Rptr (BNA) at 2152. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See note 107 and accompanying text. 
 125 Pub L No 93-247, 88 Stat 4 (1974), codified as amended at 42 USC § 5101 et seq. 
 126 CAPTA § 4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat at 7, 42 USC § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii). 
 127 Lassiter v Department of Social Services, 452 US 18, 33–34 (1981). By 1981, 
twenty-five states provided parents with a right to counsel throughout child protection 
cases, as opposed to only in termination cases. See Besharov, 6 Vt L Rev at 404–05 n 16 
(cited in note 3). This progress came through statutory rather than constitutional law. The 
Supreme Court established some due process baselines for child protection cases. See gen-
erally, for example, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972); Smith v Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816 (1977); Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745 
(1982). But, unlike in Gault, the Court did not find a constitutional right to counsel. See 
Lassiter, 452 US at 31. 
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Second, the number of child abuse and neglect reports in-
creased eightfold between 1963 and 1980, and the number of re-
sulting family-court cases increased as well.128 Taken together, 
these trends meant that in a large and increasing number of 
cases, parents would have lawyers and children would have ad-
vocates, creating similar pressures in child protection cases to 
what Polier observed in delinquency cases.129 
Third, the child protection administrative state grew increas-
ingly complex in the years after Gault and presented an alterna-
tive to court staff for making intake decisions. The Social Security 
Act130 had triggered the development of some state welfare agen-
cies to administer federal welfare payments, including in some 
states a foster care agency.131 These agencies (and federal and 
state statutes affecting them) grew more complicated in the 1960s 
and 1970s—establishing child abuse and neglect hotlines, adopt-
ing mandatory reporting statutes to require certain individuals 
to report suspected abuse or neglect, and charging child protec-
tion agencies with investigating these reports.132 Congress made 
such reporting and investigation regimes a requirement for states 
to receive federal child welfare funding when it enacted CAPTA 
in 1974.133 By that point, child protection agencies were closely 
involved with child abuse and neglect cases from their earliest 
stages—and thus could present a strong claim that they should 
control which of those cases to prosecute. 
C. Delinquency Prosecutors Reform 
After Gault, delinquency intake structures required reform, 
but it was not obvious that reforms would empower elected pros-
ecutors. If a “fundamentally fair juvenile justice proceeding might 
well look very different from a fundamentally fair criminal justice 
proceeding,”134 then creating a juvenile analog to adult criminal 
prosecutors might not be the best solution. 
 
 128 Besharov, 6 Vt L Rev at 403 (cited in note 3). 
 129 See id at 405–06. 
 130 49 Stat 620 (1935), codified as amended at 42 USC § 301 et seq. 
 131 See, for example, Abrams, A Very Special Place in Life at 138–39 (cited in note 89) 
(describing the creation of the Missouri Social Security Commission and a subagency, the 
Department of Foster Care, in response to the Social Security Act). 
 132 See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse 
and Society’s Response, 36 Ohio N U L Rev 819, 840–42 (2010). 
 133 See CAPTA § 4(b)(2)(B)–(D), 88 Stat at 6. 
 134 Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U Chi L Rev 39, 42 (2003). 
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This Section outlines initial post-Gault debates over this is-
sue and explains how elected prosecutors gradually took on 
greater power. In particular, this Section describes how family-
court leaders initially intended delinquency prosecutors to exer-
cise intake authority consistent with the family court’s rehabili-
tative purposes, but that perspective changed in the 1980s and 
1990s. By then, prosecutors were seen as tools of tough-on-crime 
reforms and used their authority to prosecute a higher propor-
tion of cases, but without establishing a consensus about intake 
structures. 
1. No immediate consensus. 
Even before Gault, scholars and government agencies were 
aware of the need for government lawyers in juvenile justice pro-
ceedings, yet there was no consensus as to who that lawyer should 
be or how that lawyer should exercise prosecutorial discretion. 
While Gault was pending before the Supreme Court, the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency called for more for-
mal and systematic intake decisions,135 and for agencies outside 
of the court to play a role in those decisions. Angst about elected 
prosecutors remained—“[u]sing the public prosecutor may be too 
great a departure from the spirit of the juvenile court”136—but the 
commission declined to identify an agency it believed ought to be 
in charge of intake or which lawyers ought to represent the 
state.137 
Soon after Gault, two academics argued about the value of 
assigning that role to regular prosecutors. Sanford Fox—a Boston 
College law professor, consultant to the President’s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, and member 
of the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Committee on the Rights of Children138—argued that 
assigning that role to an office “whose overriding concern is the 
 
 135 See The Administration of Juvenile Justice at 21 (cited in note 87). 
 136 Id at 34. In a footnote, the Commission described this as a “controversial question” 
and did not take a position beyond noting that the prosecutor could work for the district 
attorney’s office, a city’s corporation counsel’s office, the police, or some “other” unidenti-
fied agency. Id at 15 n 81. 
 137 See id at 18–19. 
 138 Jack Dunn, Sean Smith, and Nathaniel Kenyon, Sanford Fox Recalled as 
Children’s Rights Advocate (Boston College Chron, July 20, 2000), archived at 
http://perma.cc/ZLN6-7BX4. 
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vindication of the penal law by conviction and punishment of vio-
lators” would “defeat[ ] the welfare and rehabilitative functions of 
juvenile court process.”139 Fox proposed the creation of a new 
executive-branch agency—the Office of Community Advocates—
that would determine which cases to prosecute “based on a thor-
oughly investigated report concerning the social and psychologi-
cal needs of the child.”140 
Professor Douglas Besharov—who then taught at New York 
University School of Law and went on to an influential policy and 
academic career—took a competing view.141 Besharov acknowl-
edged that “hardnosed” prosecutorial methods could undermine 
the family court’s purpose,142 but offered several counterpoints. 
First, proving that an individual, even (or especially) a child, has 
committed a crime is “not for the faint of heart.”143 Second, 
Besharov articulated a faith that, with the right training, juvenile 
prosecutors could also accept and promote the juvenile justice sys-
tem’s rehabilitative goals,144 and that, with experience, juvenile 
prosecutors “can be helped to understand and appreciate” the 
value of diverting many cases.145 Besharov was less clear about 
how the training and supervision necessary to ensure this balance 
would be provided, as is evident in his passive-voice construction 
of his assertion. 
Neither Fox nor Besharov recommended that an agency spe-
cifically charged with rehabilitating children who commit crimes 
have the authority to determine which children required 
 
 139 Sanford J. Fox, Prosecutors in the Juvenile Court: A Statutory Proposal, 8 Harv J 
Legis 33, 42–43 (1970). 
 140 Id at 41–42. See also Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 13 
(cited in note 14) (suggesting shifting charging discretion from family-court staff “to the 
police, to the school, or to other administrative agencies providing protective services for 
children”). The DOJ recommended that Boston authorities form a juvenile prosecutors’ 
office that would “be distinct in personnel and organization from any other state or local 
prosecution apparatus.” Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 90 (cited 
in note 118). That jurisdiction did not follow the recommendation; prosecutorial authority 
in Boston is now held by the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office, which has a Juvenile 
Unit. See About the Office (Suffolk County District Attorney), archived at 
http://perma.cc/76CM-6BNK. 
 141 Besharov is now a professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. 
See Douglas Besharov (UM School of Public Policy), archived at http://perma.cc/83UP 
-93PR. When he published his book in 1974, Besharov taught at the NYU School of Law. 
Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 558 (cited in note 115). 
 142 Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 43–44 (cited 
in note 115). 
 143 Id at 44. 
 144 Id at 44–45. 
 145 Id. 
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prosecution—a stark contrast to contemporaneous developments 
in child protection law. The notion of a juvenile justice agency 
that determined which cases to divert and prosecute, operated di-
version programs, supervised children on probation postadjudica-
tion, and provided services to children committed to its custody 
was thus not explored. 
Many reform efforts recognized that executive-branch prose-
cuting attorneys were necessary, but failed to consider in much 
depth who those attorneys ought to be, thus skirting over Fox and 
Besharov’s debate. An illustrative book published the year after 
Gault recognized that the new requirement of defense counsel 
would necessitate counsel for the state and that probation or in-
take officers should no longer prosecute cases.146 But it listed op-
tions for who that prosecuting attorney might be—someone from 
the local prosecutor’s office or “special counsel to the police de-
partment or attorney for the court-related services”—without fur-
ther discussion of which option might be best or how these new 
family-court prosecutors would interact with (or supplant) exist-
ing intake decisionmakers.147 The ABA adopted standards for 
family-court organization in 1980 and made clear that an 
executive-branch agency should make charging decisions,148 but 
said nothing about which agency or attorneys should be involved 
in those decisions.149 
2. A gradual shift to elected prosecutors’ control and 
prosecutors as a tool of tough-on-crime reforms. 
Eventually, prosecutors exerted power at the intake stage, 
with varying roles for intake officers.150 By 1979, the ABA ob-
served that charging decisions were “increasingly vested through 
 
 146 B. James George Jr, Gault and the Juvenile Court Revolution 52 (Institute of 
Continuing Legal Education 1968). 
 147 Id at 52–53. See also id at 73–74 (noting two state statutes calling for attorneys 
general, district attorneys, or county prosecutors to represent the state in delinquency 
cases). 
 148 IJA-ABA Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to 
Court Organization and Administration 5–6, 15 (Ballinger 1980). 
 149 See id at 15–18. 
 150 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18); Joseph B. 
Tulman, The Role of the Probation Officer in Intake: Stories from before, during, and after 
the Delinquency Initial Hearing, 3 DC L Rev 235, 244 (1995) (describing 1970 statutory 
change in DC law). 
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statute in the office of the prosecutor.”151 But prosecutors ap-
peared through a variety of mechanisms—many state statutes 
were silent on the question and others were involved only through 
a family-court order.152 Some systems even hung on to the old, 
prosecutor-less, court-intake-staff-driven procedure.153 But by a 
decade after Gault, the pressure imposed by that case had re-
sulted in significant changes. As the Arizona Supreme Court ex-
plained in that year, Gault had found that state’s juvenile proce-
dures unconstitutional, and recent legislation “recognized that 
the adversary system had been introduced [by Gault].”154 The 
Arizona legislature eventually responded by both codifying juve-
niles’ right to counsel “and the role of the prosecutor”155 and shift-
ing charging authority from court intake officers to county attor-
neys.156 
Intake officers continued to play an essential role in deter-
mining which cases to prosecute, and it took time for prosecutors 
to exercise their intake authority. Prosecutors’ role often centered 
on litigating cases that someone else had chosen to file. The DOJ 
studied sixty-eight jurisdictions and found only fifteen in which 
prosecutors prepared petitions.157 As Besharov described the sit-
uation in 1974, juvenile prosecutors lacked the power of their col-
leagues that prosecute adults to initiate—or to not initiate—
charges because intake officers continued in practice to make 
those determinations.158 Prosecutors exercised their discretion at 
a later point—deciding whether to continue prosecuting a case 
that someone else had filed.159 
In these early years, a split developed regarding the offices in 
which juvenile prosecutors would work. The DOJ reported in 
1973 that nearly two-thirds of juvenile prosecutors came from lo-
cal district attorneys’ offices, with the remainder coming from 
special juvenile prosecutor offices (19 percent) or city solicitor or 
 
 151 Standards Relating to Court Organization and Administration at 17 (cited in note 148). 
 152 See Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 12 (cited in note 118). 
 153 For instance, in 1973, a group of nine police officers in Boston, Massachusetts, 
continued to prosecute juvenile delinquency cases. Id at 42. 
 154 Maricopa County, 594 P2d at 508. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 19 (cited in note 118). 
 158 See Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 194 (cited 
in note 115). See also id at 157–72 (describing court intake and adjustment procedures 
without referencing prosecutors). 
 159 See id at 194–95. 
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corporation counsel offices (9 percent).160 Municipal law offices are 
civil and thus may have a different office culture. But they oper-
ate differently than an agency attorney—they represent the 
public or the municipality as a whole and not the agency tasked 
with the job. 
The purpose of these early post-Gault roles for prosecutors 
was not to prosecute more children, but to apply the family court’s 
rehabilitative philosophy more effectively. The DOJ, for instance, 
highlighted the need for fewer children to be prosecuted in some 
jurisdictions and identified greater prosecutorial participation as 
an “essential” step to imposing a check on court intake officers 
and expanding diversion.161 Entities like DOJ that pushed for 
more prosecutorial involvement articulated a commitment to the 
historical goals of intake—balancing community protection from 
juvenile crime with “promotion of the best interests of juveniles,” 
and with the former outweighing the latter only when a child pre-
sents a “substantial threat to public safety.”162 
California’s post-Gault statutory reforms codified DOJ’s rec-
ommended approach. California’s prior statute had charged pro-
bation officers with the duty of filing juvenile petitions.163 
California amended its statute in 1976 to provide that 
prosecutors—and not probation officers—would file delinquency 
cases.164 This amendment also explained how probation officers 
and prosecutors would interact. Anyone could file a complaint 
about alleged delinquency, and the probation officer was still 
charged with investigating such complaints to determine whether 
to prosecute; when probation officers wanted to prosecute, they 
 
 160 See Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at 17 (cited in note 118); 
Besharov, Juvenile Justice Advocacy: Practice in a Unique Court at 44–46 (cited in note 115). 
 161 See Finkelstein, et al, Prosecution in the Juvenile Courts at xiv–xvi, 71–74 (cited 
in note 118). In some jurisdictions, prosecutorial involvement appeared intended to fill the 
absence of “any developed system of intake screening and diversion.” Id at 92. 
 162 Id at 28, 89. 
 163 See Cal Welf & Inst Code § 650 (West 1972). 
 164 Shifting charging authority from probation officers to prosecutors was an explicit 
purpose of the statute. Summary Digest for AB 3121, 4 Statutes of California, and Digests 
and Measures: 1975–76 Regular Session 283, 285 (1976): 
Existing law provides that a proceeding in juvenile court . . . is commenced by 
. . . the probation officer filing a petition with the court. This bill . . . would re-
quire the probation officer . . . to take a prescribed affidavit to the prosecuting 
attorney who is authorized in his discretion to institute proceedings by filing a 
petition with the juvenile court. 
776 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:743 
 
would refer cases to prosecutors, who would make a final deci-
sion.165 Consistent with a continued rehabilitative purpose, the 
statute called for probation officers to do nothing or work with the 
family without a court order for up to six months before referring 
the case to a prosecutor.166 
But soon other states’ reforms illustrated how prosecutorial 
control could serve as a tool toward a more punitive juvenile jus-
tice system. When Washington state finally codified the prosecu-
tor’s role one decade after Gault, it also amended the purpose 
statement of its juvenile code so that it included protecting the 
public and holding children “accountable for their offenses,” in ad-
dition to the historical focus on rehabilitation of children who 
commit crimes.167 With that shift as context, the legislature also 
established the role of the prosecuting attorney in juvenile-court 
cases.168 The statute established new standards for intake deci-
sions—requiring more serious charges to be prosecuted and less 
serious first-time charges to be diverted, and providing discretion 
to prosecutors regarding middle-ground charges.169 This statutory 
guidance is far more specific than in other states, but still left 
prosecutors with discretion to determine what particular charges 
to file (and thus, in many cases, to require or permit prosecution 
under the diversion statute).170 
Washington’s reforms had an immediate and significant im-
pact on charging decisions: total court referrals in King County 
(which includes Seattle) increased 60 percent, and felony charges 
 
 165 See id (“This bill . . . would require the probation officer, if he determines that law-
violating wardship proceedings should be commenced, to take a prescribed affidavit to the 
prosecuting attorney who is authorized in his discretion to institute proceedings by filing 
a petition with the juvenile court.”). 
 166 See id (“Existing law authorizes a probation officer to undertake a program of su-
pervision of a minor for not to exceed 6 months, in lieu of filing a petition or subsequent to 
a dismissal of a petition and with parental consent.”). 
 167 Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 § 55(2), 1977 Wash Laws 1023, 1023–24, codified at 
Wash Rev Code § 13.40.010(2). The addition of “accountability” as a core goal led one 
scholar to write that the 1977 act “has essentially transformed the former ‘benevolent’ 
juvenile court into a traditional criminal court system.” Jay A. Reich, The Juvenile Justice 
Act of 1977: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 14 Gonzaga L Rev 337, 341 (1979). Given the con-
tinued focus on rehabilitation in the purpose clause, that view perhaps exaggerates the 
impact. 
 168 Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 § 63, 1977 Wash Laws at 1032, Wash Rev Code 
§ 13.40.090 (“The county prosecuting attorney shall be a party to all juvenile court 
proceedings involving juvenile offenders or alleged juvenile offenders.”). 
 169 Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 § 61(3)–(6), 1977 Wash Laws at 1029–30, Wash Rev 
Code § 13.40.070(b)(5)–(8). 
 170 See Reich, 14 Gonzaga L Rev at 346–48 (cited in note 167). 
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more than doubled.171 Some prosecutors expressed concern that 
they were not well equipped to determine which teenagers re-
quired prosecution,172 but those sharp increases suggest that, at 
least in the aggregate, prosecutors resolved any such angst in fa-
vor of more frequent prosecution. 
Over the 1980s and 1990s, the role of prosecutors changed, 
resembling Washington’s post-Gault statutory reforms more than 
California’s. Increasing juvenile crime rates, racialized fear of in-
creasing crime, and decreasing faith in rehabilitation triggered 
“tough-on-crime” reforms.173 These reforms were remarkable in 
their speed and scope—forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia enacted legislation imposing more severe sentences on 
juveniles between 1992 and 1996.174 These reforms included two 
key categories. First, they expanded the number of children who 
states could try in criminal court—by lowering the ages, expand-
ing the list of crimes that could trigger a waiver to criminal court, 
permitting repeat offenders to be waived, and in some states, 
granting prosecutors authority to directly file cases in criminal 
court.175 Second, legislatures tied more juvenile dispositions to the 
specific offense(s) adjudicated.176 
These reforms indicated an essential shift in the role of the 
prosecutor; they also leveraged that shift, coupled with prosecu-
tors’ increased intake authority, to effect a broader change in the 
juvenile justice system. Juvenile prosecutors were no longer the 
inheritors of the family court’s historical role of balancing com-
munity protection with juvenile offenders’ rehabilitation and 
other needs. Now, prosecutors were the instruments of reforms 
that followed a more punitive and less rehabilitative approach. 
These reforms shifted authority to juvenile prosecutors through 
exercise of their relatively new charging authority.177 By deter-
mining what charges to file, prosecutors could determine whether 
 
 171 Total referrals in July and August 1977 were 1,906, and total referrals in July and 
August 1978 were 3,046, a 60 percent increase. Total felony charges increased from 425 in 
those two months in 1977 to 855 in 1978, a 101 percent increase. Id at 351. 
 172 See id at 348–49. 
 173 See generally Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court—Part II: Race 
and the “Crack Down” on Youth Crime, 84 Minn L Rev 327 (1999). 
 174 See Patricia Torbet, et al, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime 
*59 (OJJDP, 1996), archived at http://perma.cc/39Y9-JHAU. 
 175 See id at *3–9. 
 176 The precise method varied—including blended sentencing, mandatory minimum 
commitments, and extended family-court jurisdiction. See id at *11–15. 
 177 See Beale, 44 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 522 (cited in note 43). 
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to trigger any of the new offense-based provisions. Contempora-
neous observers readily concluded that the reforms’ aggregate ef-
fect was to shift power from judges to prosecutors178 and to do so 
because the “prevailing sentiment [was] that juvenile court judges 
are too ‘soft’ on juvenile crime; . . . and that nonjudicial [prosecuto-
rial] decisions are more likely” to take a tougher approach.179 
Indeed, while prosecutors are not monolithic, empirical evi-
dence soon emerged to show that they effectuated more punitive 
decisions following these reforms. Professors Donna Bishop and 
Charles Frazier surveyed a set of Florida prosecutors soon after 
waiver reforms were enacted and found that “nearly half” es-
poused a punitive philosophy “completely antithetical to the basic 
precepts traditionally associated with juvenile justice.”180 Prose-
cutors increased their use of waiver,181 even in cases involving 
children who were not “serious and chronic offenders.”182 And 
studies of other jurisdictions revealed that granting prosecutors 
the authority to trigger more severe sentences led to prosecutors 
doing precisely that.183  Some recent legislative and judicial devel-
opments that limit prosecutorial waiver reflect the concern that 
prosecutors would have an overly punitive perspective. Most 
prominently, California voters in 2016 enacted Proposition 57, 
which ended prosecutorial direct file and restored judicial waiver 
as the norm. One of the proposition’s explicit purposes was 
 
 178 See Torbet, et al, State Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime at *60 
(cited in note 174). 
 179 Id. Critics of these developments put the concern more bluntly—echoing Fox’s 
argument from the immediate post-Gault period. Prosecutors, the critics argued, “his-
torically have been more concerned with retribution than with rehabilitation.” Bishop 
and Frazier, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 285 (cited in note 63) (summarizing 
criticisms). 
 180 Bishop and Frazier, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 291 (cited in note 
63). Bishop and Frazier categorized prosecutors’ philosophies as “pure just deserts,” 
“modified just deserts,” and those who endorsed a more traditional, rehabilitation-
focused view. See id at 290–91. 
 181 See id at 292. 
 182 Id at 297. 
 183 See, for example, Marcy R. Podkopacz and Barry C. Feld, The Back-Door to Prison: 
Waiver Reform, “Blended Sentencing,” and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 91 J 
Crim L & Crimin 997, 1009, 1023–24 (2001) (finding significant expansion of more severe 
sentencing following a law granting prosecutors greater authority to seek waiver and “ex-
tended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution”—which provided for longer sentences within 
family court). 
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“[s]topping the revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabili-
tation, especially for juveniles,” implying that prosecutors were 
not adequately “emphasizing rehabilitation.”184 
Scholars have tended to focus on more frequent waivers of 
family-court jurisdiction and the growing prevalence of tough dis-
positions in delinquency cases,185 but prosecutors’ increasing 
power and their increasingly punitive approach had important ef-
fects throughout the juvenile justice system. Studies of the organ-
izational culture of family court found that these trends increased 
those courts’ adversarial tone and “punitive climate.”186 
Crucially, prosecutors’ increasing authority had an essential 
impact on intake decisions. At the same time as those other re-
forms occurred, prosecutors began using their charging discretion 
to prosecute a greater percentage of children referred to family 
court, thus diverting fewer. Prior to the tough-on-crime reforms, 
more cases were diverted or dismissed than formally processed; 
45.7 percent of cases were formally prosecuted in 1985.187 
Although older data are less reliable, earlier surveys suggested 
similar numbers.188 The percentage of cases prosecuted shifted up, 
peaking at 57.3 percent in 1998 and 1999.189 Juvenile crime and 
the total number of juvenile delinquency cases has dropped dra-
matically since the 1990s, but the percentage of cases prosecuted 
remains in the mid-fifties, close to its peak reached during the era 
of tough-on-crime reforms.190 That is, the shift to prosecutorial 
 
 184 People v Superior Court, 2018 WL 652425, *5 (Cal) (quoting the Proposition 57 
voter information guide). In 2018, the California Supreme Court held that Proposition 57 
applied retroactively, which took power away from district attorneys, who would not be 
“neutral” arbiters; reducing prosecutors’ power served as a means to reduce sentences and 
provide an “ameliorating benefit” to defendants. Id. 
 185 See Feld, 84 Minn L Rev at 327 (cited in note 173). 
 186 Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: Cultural, Political, and 
Procedural Dynamics in California Juvenile Justice, 41 L & Society Rev 387, 421–23 (2007). 
 187 Statistical Briefing Book: Juveniles in Court—Manner of Handling (OJJDP), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/NC7Q-ZU6E (reflecting that the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention formally handled 530,300 cases out of 1,159,400 cases in 1985). 
This website links to data that provide specific numbers for each year. 
 188 One national study found that 52 percent of all family-court referrals made in 1957 
were handled “pre-judicially”—that is, without prosecution. The figure was “substantially 
the same” in 1964. The Administration of Juvenile Justice at 14 (cited in note 87). Another 
study comparing national longitudinal survey of youth data similarly finds a significant 
increase in the likelihood that authorities would prosecute rather than divert a child. See 
Stevens and Morash, 13 Youth Violence & Juv Just at 89 (cited in note 38). 
 189 Statistical Briefing Book: Juveniles in Court (cited in note 187) (memorializing the 
3,538,600 cases total in 1998 and 1999, with 2,027,900 formally pursued). 
 190 From 2004–2013, the figure ranged from a low of 53.4 percent in 2010 to 55.6 per-
cent in 2006. In the most recent year available, 2014, the rate was 55.6 percent. Id. The 
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control coincides with a lasting 10 percent increase in the propor-
tion of cases prosecuted, and a concomitant decrease in the num-
ber of cases diverted. Although it is difficult to prove causation 
empirically, it seems likely that the shift to prosecutorial control 
contributed to this shift.191 This shift has a tremendous effect—a 
10 percent increase in the number of cases prosecuted amounts to 
more than 100,000 more cases prosecuted every year.192 
In practice in many jurisdictions, prosecutors’ offices took on 
decisive roles in making charging decisions even when intake of-
ficers had a statutory role. In 1995, Professor Joseph Tulman de-
scribed how intake officers frequently failed to comply with their 
statutory mandate to determine which children truly needed 
family-court attention.193 In multiple cases, Tulman and his stu-
dents in a law school juvenile defense clinic observed the social 
factors inquiry entirely absent or overruled by prosecutors con-
sidering other factors.194 In some cases, prosecutors’ office staff 
even completed forms that intake officers were supposed to com-
plete.195 In others, intake officers recommended charging particu-
lar children to accommodate prosecutors, even without doing a 
required investigation.196 The bottom line in practice was that 
“the prosecutor had usurped the function of the intake probation 
officer,” de-emphasizing, if not erasing, the statutorily mandated 
consideration of social factors.197 
One result of de-emphasizing social factors in intake was to 
weaken what ought to be a powerful check on what became known 
as the school-to-prison pipeline. Normal adolescent behavior198—
such as minor fights or disobedience to school authorities—calls 
 
DOJ has reported this trend elsewhere. See Delinquency Cases in Juvenile Court, 2013 at 
*3 (cited in note 21) (“The proportion of delinquency cases petitioned for formal handling 
rose from 46% in 1985 to 57% in the late 1990s and then declined slightly to 55% in 2013.”). 
 191 See Charles Lindner, Probation Intake: Gatekeeper to the Family Court, 72 Fed 
Probation 48, 52 (June 2008) (“The increase in the number of petitioned cases may be due, 
at least in part, to greater prosecutorial control in many courts.”). 
 192 There are more than one million delinquency cases every year. See Delinquency 
Cases in Juvenile Court, 2013 at *2 (cited in note 21). 
 193 See Tulman, 3 DC L Rev at 235–36 (cited in note 150). 
 194 See id at 238, 244. 
 195 See id at 237–44. 
 196 See id at 244. 
 197 Tulman, 3 DC L Rev at 244 (cited in note 150). 
 198 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 397–401 (cited in note 10) (“Reckless behavior, 
including the delinquent activity described here, is so common among adolescents that it 
has been described as virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development.”) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
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for school discipline but generally not prosecution. Intake proce-
dure should screen out such cases; absent more severe facts or 
repeat incidents, these cases represent behavior that teenagers 
are very likely to simply grow out of, rendering any court rehabil-
itation unnecessary.199 For relatively less severe charges, prose-
cuting children can impose lasting harms, such as reduced high 
school graduation200 and increased reoffending rates.201 Moreover, 
children with disabilities whose behavior may be a manifestation 
of their disability, or who may not have received adequate special 
education services, generally do not need rehabilitation in family 
court—they need good special education services.202 Similarly, 
children who have mental health conditions or family problems 
that trigger behavioral difficulties at school deserve interventions 
tailored to those problems before the state prosecutes them. 
This prosecutorial, rather than rehabilitative, mindset is il-
lustrated by South Carolina’s experience with charges for “dis-
turbing schools.”203 One recent high-profile case involved a stu-
dent at Spring Valley High School in Columbia, South Carolina, 
charged with disturbing schools for refusing a teacher’s and as-
sistant principal’s instruction to put her cell phone away. The 
teacher called a school administrator, who called the school re-
source officer—a deputy sheriff assigned to the school—who 
pulled the child out of her desk and dragged her across the class-
room floor. Other students recorded the incident on their cell 
phones, leading to significant critical attention, both of the of-
ficer’s use of force and his ability to charge the student with the 
crime of “disturbing schools” for the student’s relatively minor 
misbehavior.204 Faced with public calls to dismiss the charge, the 
prosecutor said he would make charging decisions “based only on 
evidence and in accordance with the law”—without any reference 
to the historical social factors that are supposed to guide intake 
 
 199 See id at 400 (“As youth grow and mature, their cognitive and psychological capac-
ities improve.”). 
 200 See note 27 and accompanying text. 
 201 See text accompanying note 26. 
 202 Willis, 2016 BYU Educ & L J at 192–95, 204–06 (cited in note 62). 
 203 SC Code Ann § 16-17-420. 
 204 The case received much attention following the release of video showing the officer 
pulling the child out of her desk and dragging her across the classroom floor. The chief 
local elected prosecutor issued a public investigative summary making clear that the of-
ficer arrested the student solely for her classroom behavior. See Letter from Fifth Judicial 
Circuit Solicitor Dan Johnson to Captain John Bishop *1–2 (Sept 2, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NLZ8-RX9G (“Johnson Letter”). 
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decisions, and without articulating why charging a student for re-
fusing a teacher’s command would serve any rehabilitative pur-
pose.205 When the prosecutor eventually dismissed the charge, he 
said he believed the student was guilty but that he likely could 
not convict her.206 The prosecutor again engaged in no analysis of 
whether prosecuting the child served any rehabilitative pur-
pose.207 That prosecutorial mindset extends beyond a single case. 
Aggregate statistics regarding disturbing-schools charges208 illus-
trate how prosecutors choose to prosecute more cases than juve-
nile justice agency staff or court intake officers would. Data re-
leased by the state Department of Juvenile Justice reveal that 
over a five-and-a-half-year period, South Carolina prosecutors 
overruled department recommendations for diversion and prose-
cuted 1,564 cases, about 20 percent of all cases the department 
recommended for diversion.209 
D. Child Protection Prosecutors Reform 
As with delinquency law, the evolution of child protection 
family-court prosecutors began with ambiguous post-Gault com-
mentary. Many child protection authorities recommended placing 
prosecutorial discretion in the executive branch, but were not 
clear whether they should reside with prosecutors, child protec-
tion agencies, or some other entity. The ABA’s 1980 standards, 
for instance, recommended placing prosecutorial authority in the 
executive branch, but declined to explain who specifically should 
determine which child protection cases to file.210 
 
 205 See Statement of Fifth Judicial Circuit Solicitor Dan Johnson (Dec 17, 2015), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8T6M-3XBF. See also Solicitor: No Involvement in Charges 
against Spring Valley HS Teens until FBI Investigation Over (WSMV-TV Nashville, Dec 
16, 2015), online at http://www.wsmv.com/story/30763259/black-parents-association 
-wants-charges-against-teens-dropped (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(describing advocates’ efforts and the solicitor’s response). 
 206 See Johnson Letter at *11 (cited in note 204). 
 207 See id. 
 208 There were 1,222 disturbing-schools referrals in 2014–2015, making disturbing 
schools the second most frequent charge in the state. See 2014–2015 Annual Statistical 
Report at *13–14 (cited in note 34). 
 209 See Declaration of Megan French Marcelin in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Class Certification and Preliminary Injunction, Kenny v Wilson, Civil Action No 16-2794, 
*5 (D SC filed Aug 16, 2016). 
 210 See Standards Relating to Court Organization and Administration at 5–6 (cited 
in note 148). 
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Family-court prosecutors in child protection law developed in 
a manner that more strongly emphasized the role of administra-
tive agencies than in delinquency cases. Comprehensive child pro-
tection agencies developed that operated central child protection 
intake hotlines, conducted child protection investigations, man-
aged child abuse and neglect registries, and operated foster care 
systems. These agencies soon supplanted court intake officers and 
often effectively determined which cases to file in family court. 
Some states granted child protection agencies the authority to file 
cases directly, while others granted elected prosecutors’ offices 
that power. Between those two options, no national norm devel-
oped, and “great[ ] variation” has existed between states.211 
Even without a national norm, child protection agencies 
could wield great influence over intake decisions. These agencies 
conduct their own investigations and bring cases to the executive-
branch lawyer who could proceed with the case or not. The lawyer 
is not likely to file a case that the agency did not want to file—
absent a nonagency actor bringing such a case to a prosecutor’s 
attention (which, as discussed in Part III.C, remains possible in 
many states), the prosecutor would simply not know about it. 
Justice William Brennan recognized the “Department’s control 
over the decision whether to take steps to protect a particular 
child from suspected abuse” regardless of whether formal au-
thority to take such steps rested with the agency or an elected 
prosecutor.212 
The interaction between child protection agencies and their 
executive-branch lawyers remained fraught, especially when 
those lawyers worked for local prosecutor’s offices. Professor 
David Herring reported the observations of such attorneys in 
Michigan in the 1980s. In many counties, child protection cases 
were typically assigned to junior attorneys in the prosecutor’s 
 
 211 Mark Hardin, Role of the Legal and Judicial System for Children, Youth, and 
Families in Foster Care, in Gerald P. Mallon and Peg McCartt Hess, eds, Child Welfare 
for the Twenty-First Century: A Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 687, 692–
93 (Columbia 2d ed 2005). Compare also, for example, 10A Okla Stat Ann §§ 1-4-301, 1-4-
901 (granting the district attorney rights to file all child protection cases), with, for exam-
ple, SC Code Ann § 63-7-1660(A) (authorizing the Department of Social Services to peti-
tion the family court). 
 212 DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 US 189, 209 
(1989) (Brennan dissenting). Even when the agency lacked its own lawyer, Brennan con-
cluded that the agency’s discretion was only “subject to the approval of the local govern-
ment’s corporation counsel,” and so “the buck effectively stopped with the Department.” 
Id (Brennan dissenting). 
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offices and, “where this occurs, the juvenile court becomes a train-
ing arena for inexperienced assistant prosecutors.”213 Prosecutors 
would often cause delays in cases by failing to appear at prelimi-
nary and dispositional hearings.214 Prosecutors would not offer 
“active legal consultation” to agency staff during the life of 
cases.215 And prosecutors would exercise their authority to over-
ride the agency’s wishes regarding whether and how to proceed 
in cases.216 
Such critiques lead to something close to a majority view 
within the child protection literature—though with one notable 
exception and, as we shall see in Part III.A, without achieving a 
consensus in state laws. That majority favors representation of 
child protection agencies by agency attorneys, with agencies em-
powered to make intake decisions. By 1999, the Department of 
Health and Human Services endorsed the view that lawyers 
should represent child protection agencies—not the state more 
broadly—and that agency lawyers should counsel agency staff 
from early points in a case.217 The ABA made similar recommen-
dations in its 2004 “Standards of Practice for Lawyers 
Representing Child Welfare Agencies,” whose title aptly referred 
to lawyers for agencies, not states. Agency representation would 
respect agencies’ knowledge of specific families and the child pro-
tection field, the ABA argued, while a prosecutorial model would 
risk the substitution of “political agendas” and lawyers’ “personal 
beliefs” for agency knowledge.218 
The child protection literature focuses strongly on the ques-
tion of who a lawyer represents—the agency, the state, or people 
more broadly.219 If the agency is the client, the lawyer can advise 
agency staff about the legal basis for a potential court action, or 
how a particular decision can support broader agency goals, but 
 
 213 David J. Herring, Legal Representation for the State Child Welfare Agency in Civil 
Child Protection Proceedings: A Comparative Study, 24 U Toledo L Rev 603, 608 (1993). 
 214 See id at 609. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See id at 609–10. 
 217 See Donald N. Duquette and Mark Hardin, Guidelines for Public Policy and State 
Legislation Governing Permanence for Children VII-8 to -11 (Children’s Bureau 1999). 
 218 American Bar Association, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Child 
Welfare Agencies *3–4 (2004), available at http://perma.cc/W4HM-QN5C. See also Mimi 
Laver, Foundations for Success: Strengthening Your Agency Attorney Office 112–14 (ABA 
1999) (contrasting an agency model with prosecutors who “get the final word” and disre-
gard agency staff views). 
 219 See, for example, Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Child Welfare 
Agencies at *3–4 (cited in note 218). 
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must ultimately abide by the agency’s decisions regarding case 
objectives and let the agency make core decisions, such as 
whether to file a case. If a lawyer disagrees with a caseworker’s 
opinion on a case, the lawyer could consult more senior agency 
staff but would be bound by the client’s ultimate direction.220 But 
if the lawyer represents the amorphous “state” or “the people,” 
then the lawyer has freer rein to determine what the client 
wants.221 And the lawyer also then “abdicates” the job of counsel-
ing the agency—because the agency is not a client to be advised.222 
More general agency principles weigh strongly against attorneys 
for agencies using their own views to overrule an agency’s wishes 
about litigation.223 
In contrast, Besharov suggested granting child protection 
prosecutors the authority to determine whether a case that the 
agency wished to file ought to have been diverted, and whether a 
case that the agency does not wish to file nonetheless needs court 
attention.224 Besharov wrote in 1981, before the commentators 
discussed above, and so did not respond to them and did not, in 
particular, explain why counseling the agency client about the fil-
ing decision would not suffice. Besharov did acknowledge that his 
proposal would cause conflicts between child protection prosecu-
tors and agencies, but he suggested that “if such conflicts are han-
dled with tact and mutual respect, then a resolution, or at least a 
modus vivendi, will be reached—in much the same way that the 
police and district attorneys have accommodated themselves to 
their frequently conflicting perspectives.”225 
The debate between Besharov’s position and the more recent 
arguments for agency control remains unresolved in the law. 
When a lawyer working for a local prosecutor’s office handles 
child protection cases, disputes have arisen about who such a law-
yer represents—and there is no uniform answer. In West 
Virginia, the child protection agency won a ruling requiring local 
prosecutors to treat it as the client and thus defer to its wishes on 
 
 220 Some boundaries would remain—a lawyer could not, for instance, file a petition 
without an adequate legal or factual basis. 
 221 See Laver, Foundations for Success at 112–14 (cited in note 218); Herring, 24 U 
Toledo L Rev at 623 (cited in note 213). 
 222 See Herring, 24 U Toledo L Rev at 624 (cited in note 213). 
 223 See Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: 
Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 
Georgetown L J 1, 36–43 (1990). 
 224 See Besharov, 6 Vt L Rev at 412 (cited in note 3). 
 225 Id at 412–13. 
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core case decisions.226 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine ruled 
instead that prosecutors represented the “public interest,” leav-
ing the agency as something other than the prosecutor’s client 
and subject to the prosecutor’s view of a case.227 This distinction 
is evident in state agencies’ responses to an ABA survey regard-
ing their representation models in 2009. Agencies split evenly—
twenty-one reported that lawyers were agency staff or contractors 
and twenty-one reported that they were prosecutors or county at-
torneys.228 But a stronger majority reported that the agency was 
seen as the client; thirty-six jurisdictions reported that lawyers 
represented the agency (even if the lawyers worked at the local 
prosecutor’s office), while nine states reported that they represent 
the people.229 
III.  THE CURRENT INCONSISTENT LANDSCAPE 
Descriptively, states have not consistently resolved key ques-
tions about family-court prosecutors in either juvenile delin-
quency or child protection cases. Inconsistencies across states re-
flect the absence of a settled structural understanding of who 
should make essential intake decisions and how they should 
make them. This Part offers the first accounting of how varying 
state laws govern delinquency and child protection prosecutors. 
Differences range across two related questions. First, who is 
the government lawyer—an agency lawyer, a lawyer in an elected 
prosecutor’s office, or some other kind of lawyer? Embedded in 
this question is who that lawyer represents—a specific agency, or 
the state or people writ large? Second, what role do administra-
tive agencies play in deciding which cases to prosecute and which 
to dismiss or divert? When the lawyer involved works for and rep-
resents a specific agency, that agency has authority to exercise 
this prosecutorial discretion. But in the majority of other cases—
 
 226 See In re Jonathan G., 482 SE2d 893, 908–10 (W Va 1996). 
 227 See Superintendent of Insurance v Attorney General, 558 A2d 1197, 1199–1200 
(Me 1989). 
 228 The survey reported agencies’ understanding of their states’ representation mod-
els, not actual statutes. Seventeen jurisdictions reported a statewide agency lawyer model 
and four reported a county-based agency lawyer model. Twelve reported a county-based 
prosecutorial model, while nine reported a statewide prosecutorial model. Six states re-
ported some other system, often a hybrid. Ramon Ruiz and Scott Trowbridge, National 
Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models 3 (ABA Center on Children and the 
Law 2009). The data were based on responses from forty-six states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Navajo Nation. Id at 2. 
 229 Id at 6. 
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in many states for child protection cases, and in almost all states 
for delinquency cases—the precise balance of power between 
prosecutor and agency and the role of each is essential to under-
standing intake decisions. 
Complicating matters further, many states’ laws maintain 
vestiges of family courts’ pre-Gault structures—especially the 
ability of private individuals to file child protection or delin-
quency cases and the significant role that court-employed intake 
officers exercise in charging decisions. This Part surveys state 
laws regarding family-court prosecutors in juvenile delinquency, 
then child protection cases, and then explores these pre-Gault 
vestiges. 
A. Juvenile Delinquency Prosecutors 
In juvenile delinquency cases, the biggest variety in state law 
and practice is the interaction between an agency with some 
intake role—a state department of juvenile justice, or an execu-
tive- or judicial-branch probation department—and prosecutors. 
Prosecutors more uniformly work for an independent executive-
branch office—a division of the local elected prosecutor in most 
states, or for the local municipality’s corporation counsel (or city 
or county attorney, or the like) in other states. 
The relative power and role of intake officers and prosecutors 
“var[ies] widely.”230 Earlier authors have placed the relationship 
between intake officers and prosecutors along a spectrum. At one 
end, intake officers hold most of the power, determining which 
cases to divert or dismiss and which to file; prosecutors review 
only those cases that intake officers wish to file, and review them 
only for legal sufficiency. At the other end, prosecutors review all 
delinquency referrals and determine whether to prosecute them, 
with various gradations between the two poles.231 
Yet in the existing literature, “[n]o national inventory exists 
to document which arrangement is most common or how intake 
 
 230 See Lindner, 72 Fed Probation at 48 (cited in note 191). 
 231 See Carrie J. Petrucci and H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile Court, Bridging the Past and 
the Future, in Albert R. Roberts, ed, Juvenile Justice Sourcebook: Past, Present, and Future 
248, 264 (Oxford 2004). Professor Carrie J. Petrucci and Judge H. Ted Rubin identify three 
points in between: intake officers have intake authority for specific charges, with limits 
for more serious charges; intake officers may recommend decisions to prosecutors, who can 
both prosecute a case recommended for diversion and divert a case recommended for pros-
ecution; and intake officers may make recommendations regarding less serious charges, 
but prosecutors make all intake decisions for more serious charges. Id. 
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practices actually work in practice.”232 This Section provides an 
inventory of current statutory structures. Variation exists along 
two planes in these statutes. First is the question of which offices 
employ juvenile prosecutors. In most states, elected prosecutors 
(district attorneys, county attorneys, or states attorneys) prose-
cute children in family court, but a minority of states assign that 
task to a different office or permit different practices in different 
parts of the state. The second plane is the precise balance of power 
between family-court prosecutors and nonlawyer intake officials. 
Both planes are reflected in Figure 1. Categorizing state statutes 
along this spectrum involves some classification questions, which 
are explored in the footnotes. 
At the latter end of the spectrum, thirteen states grant pros-
ecutors complete or near-complete authority over intake deci-
sions. These states’ statutes charge prosecutors with evaluating 
complaints filed against children and determining whether to dis-
miss, divert, or prosecute those cases. Eleven of these states 
assign such power to elected prosecutors,233 while two assign this 
power to other executive-branch attorneys or permit varying 
practices around the state.234 
Ten more states give prosecutors authority to make these in-
take decisions, but require probation officers or juvenile justice 
agency staff to give prosecutors intake recommendations first. 
Nine of these states give elected prosecutors this authority,235 
while a tenth state permits either elected prosecutors or other 
executive-branch attorneys to do so.236 
 
 232 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18). 
 233 See Ariz Rev Stat §§ 8-301(2), 8-326; Colo Rev Stat §§ 19-2-106, 19-2-512; La Chil-
dren’s Code Ann Arts 839, 842; Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 119, § 54; Minn Stat Ann 
§ 260B.141(4); Minn Rule Juv Delinq Proc 6.02(2); SD Cod Laws §§ 26-7A-9 to -10; Tex 
Fam Code Ann §§ 51.02(11), 53.012; 33 Vt Stat Ann § 5201; 3 Vt Stat Ann § 163; Wash 
Rev Code § 13.40.070; W Va Code §§ 49-4-503 to -504; Wyo Stat Ann § 14-6-211. Several 
variations exist within these states. Arizona family-court judges retain discretion to divert 
cases involving first-time misdemeanants. Ariz Rev Stat § 8-307(A). Washington prosecu-
tors may delegate intake decisions regarding misdemeanors to probation counselors. Wash 
Rev Code § 13.40.070(10). 
 234 See Del Fam Ct Rule Crim Proc 7; Neb Rev Stat § 43-274 (granting the county 
attorney—the regular county prosecutor—or the city attorney power to offer diversion or 
file charges). 
 235 See Ark Code Ann §§ 9-27-310(b)(1), (d), 9-27-323(a); Idaho Code §§ 20-510 to -511; 
705 ILCS Stat §§ 405/5-305, 405/5-330; Ind Code §§ 31-37-8-5 to -6; Kan Stat Ann §§ 38-
2230, 38-2233, 38-2327; Ky Rev Stat Ann §§ 610.030, 635.010; NM Stat Ann §§ 32A-1-
6(A), 32A-2-7, 32A-2-8; 10A Okla Stat Ann § 2-2-104(A); SC Code Ann § 63-19-1010. 
 236 See NY Fam Ct Law §§ 254, 308.1. 
2018] Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors 789 
 
In the middle of the spectrum, one state’s statute assigns 
shared intake authority to elected prosecutors and intake staff.237 
Further down the spectrum are states that give greater au-
thority to intake officers employed by probation departments or 
the family court itself. Eight states and the District of Columbia 
grant intake officers or agency staff power to decide whether to 
divert a child, subject to review by prosecutors only when the com-
plainant or law enforcement appeals a diversion decision. Eight 
of these jurisdictions assign elected prosecutors to this role,238 and 
one assigns other executive-branch attorneys.239 
At the far end of the spectrum, sixteen states empower intake 
officers, agency staff, or the family court itself to make intake de-
cisions. Ten of these assign elected prosecutors to represent the 
state when intake officers recommend prosecution,240 and five ei-
ther assign to other executive-branch attorneys the role of prose-
cuting children or permit varying practices around the state.241 
Two states are outliers: Alaska is unique because it grants 
its juvenile justice agency complete charging authority, and 
grants that agency its own lawyers.242 Missouri is an outlier 
 
 237 See NH Rev Stat Ann § 169-B:10 (authorizing the prosecutor, police, or probation 
officer to refer children to diversion programs). 
 238 See Cal Welf & Inst Code §§ 653, 653.5, 653.7, 655; Fla Stat Ann §§ 985.15, 
985.145; Iowa Code §§ 232.12, 232.28, 232.35; 15 Me Rev Stat Ann § 3301; Mont Code Ann 
§§ 41-5-1202, 41-5-1204 to -1205, 41-5-1401; Nev Rev Stat § 62C.100; NC Gen Stat §§ 7B-
1702 to -1705; Va Code §§ 16.1-232, 16.1-260(B), (E)–(F). 
 239 See DC Code §§ 16-2305, 16-2305.02. 
 240 See Ala Code Ann §§ 12-15-105, 12-15-118, 12-15-119, 12-15-120; Ala Rules Juv 
Proc 12, 15; Ga Code Ann §§ 15-11-68, 15-11-520, 15-18-6.1, 15-11-515; Md Ct & Jud Pro-
ceedings Code Ann § 3-8A-10 (giving intake officers authority to make diversion decisions 
in misdemeanor cases but state attorneys’ power in felony cases); Mich Comp Laws 
§§ 712A.11, 722.823; Miss Code §§ 43-21-117, 43-21-357, 43-21-451; NJ Stat Ann 
§§ 2A:4A-71, 2A:4A-72; ND Cent Code §§ 27-20-10, 27-20-19, 27-20-20; Ohio Rev Code Ann 
§ 2151.14; Ohio Rule Juv Proc 9; In re N.K., 2003 WL 23009113, *3 (Ohio App) (“[T]he pur-
suit of a delinquency complaint under Juv. R. 9 remains a matter for judicial discretion.”); 
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 6304, 6323(a)(2), 6336(b); Utah Code Ann § 78A-6-602(2)(c); Wis Stat 
§§ 938.06, 938.067, 938.09, 938.24(5). This category also includes some variation. Both 
Mississippi and New Jersey subject intake officer decisions to court review but do not permit 
prosecutors to reject an intake officer’s decision to divert a case unilaterally. See Miss Code 
§§ 43-21-117, 43-21-357, 43-21-451; NJ Stat Ann § 2A:4A-71, 2A:4A-72. 
 241 See Conn Gen Stat §§ 46b-121b, 46b-128; Haw Rev Stat §§ 571-21, 571-31.2, 571-
62; Or Rev Stat §§ 419C.225, 419C.250; RI Gen Laws § 14-1-11; Tenn Code Ann §§ 37-1-
110, 37-1-124(b). 
 242 See Alaska Stat Ann §§ 47.12.040, 47.12.060, 47.12.065, 47.12.110 (giving the 
Department of Health and Social Services authority to determine which to divert and 
which to prosecute, and giving district attorneys authority to prosecute only more serious 
cases that are referred by the department). 
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because it does not provide any executive-branch lawyer; it fol-
lows a pre-Gault model of court staff and court staff attorneys 
making all charging decisions.243 
FIGURE 1.  THE SPECTRUM OF PROSECUTORIAL AND INTAKE 
OFFICER CONTROL UNDER STATE STATUTES 
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This spectrum describes each state’s governing statutes. It 
does not explore varying practices that may occur within states 
whose statutes place them at different points of the spectrum.244 
For instance, states that give prosecutors ultimate authority to 
make intake decisions but require intake officers or juvenile jus-
tice agencies to provide recommendations may have varying prac-
tices. Some local prosecutors may take those recommendations in 
nearly every case—effectively delegating intake authority to in-
take officers—while others may more actively assert their intake 
authority. Some intake officers with the authority to make intake 
decisions may exercise it fully, while others may defer in practice 
 
 243 See Mo Rev Stat §§ 211.081, 211.401; Mo S Ct Rule 116.03. At least one court-
employed prosecutor has described Missouri’s system as “pre-Gault,” a description endorsed 
by the National Juvenile Defender Center. Mary Ann Scali, et al, Missouri: Justice 
Rationed—an Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of Juvenile Defense 
Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 37–38 (National Juvenile Defender Center 2013). 
 244 See Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 164 (cited in note 19) (describing varying 
practices). 
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to the expressed or perceived wishes of prosecutors or face signif-
icant pressures to do so.245 
B. Child Protection Prosecutors 
In child protection cases, some states assign lawyers to work 
directly for and represent child protection agencies, and empower 
these agencies to determine which cases to file.246 Other states, 
however, assign other legal offices—especially local district attor-
ney offices or state attorney general offices.247 Some of these law-
yers are assigned by state law to represent child protection agen-
cies, while others operate like elected criminal prosecutors—
representing “the people” and relying on their own judgment or 
prosecutor office policies regarding that client’s interests rather 
than direction from an agency client.248 
Although no trend has yet emerged, several states have re-
cently wrestled with whether to assign child protection agencies 
or elected prosecutors with charging discretion and with the iden-
tity and role of executive-branch lawyers.249 The Oregon legisla-
ture created a task force to develop a representation model for the 
state in child protection cases,250 which recommended that the 
child protection agency use its funds to pay the state department 
of justice to represent the agency251—a change from Oregon’s cur-
rent prosecutorial model.252 This shift would address concerns 
that the child protection agency frequently lacks representation 
 
 245 See Tulman, 3 DC L Rev at 235–44 (cited in note 150) (describing the latter scenario). 
 246 See note 264 and accompanying text. 
 247 See note 265 and accompanying text. 
 248 See notes 259–62 and accompanying text. 
 249 The issue has also arisen in at least one local jurisdiction. One rural Wisconsin 
county district attorney, citing a lack of resources, announced that his office would no 
longer represent the state in child protection cases, leading to a temporary appointment 
of a special prosecutor to handle both child protection and delinquency cases. See Tim 
Greenwood, State to Pay for Special Prosecutor (Eagle Herald, July 27, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2THH-CJAQ. 
 250 See Governor Kate Brown, Task Force on Legal Representation in Childhood 
Dependency (Oregon.gov), archived at http://perma.cc/RM57-34NH, citing SB 222, 2015 Or 
Laws 2108. 
 251 See Oregon Task Force on Dependency Representation, Report July 2016 *5–6 
(2016), archived at http://perma.cc/B2XV-FCBJ (“Oregon Task Force Final Report”). The 
report made clear that local district attorneys could continue to represent “‘the people’ as 
opposed to the agency,” but at their own expense—“limited DHS funds should be allocated 
to provide full representation for the agency.” Id at *28. 
 252 See Ruiz and Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation 
Models at 10 (cited in note 228) (reporting Oregon’s description of its prosecutorial model, 
in which the local district attorney would represent the state, not the agency, and “need 
not take the same position as” the agency). 
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when a case begins.253 Florida has engaged in controversial shifts, 
moving first to agency lawyers and then to a prosecutorial model, 
which has been criticized recently.254 In 2013, Iowa moved toward 
a prosecutorial model, amending its statutes to require county at-
torneys to represent the state, not the child protection agency as 
it had previously done.255 In 2015, following academic256 and 
DOJ257 criticism of Missouri’s “juvenile officer” mode of selecting 
which cases to file, the Missouri Supreme Court ordered modest 
changes to that structure.258 
The landscape remains varied across the country. One state 
surveyed its peers in 2015 and found a variety of employers of 
state attorneys and a variety of roles for those attorneys.259 Only 
seven states reported having in-house agency counsel, three 
states reported representation by local prosecutors’ offices, and 
nine states reported representation by the attorney general.260 
 
 253 See id at 14. 
 254 Through the 1980s, caseworkers often appeared unrepresented, until the Florida 
Supreme Court declared that to be the unauthorized practice of law and required the 
agency to prevent such practice by 1990. The Florida Bar in re Advisory Opinion HRS 
Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 S2d 909, 909 (Fla 1989). The state responded by creating 
agency lawyers—the statewide Child Welfare Legal Services Department, housed within 
the agency and understood to represent the agency. Florida Department of Children and 
Families, Report: Dependency Roles Workgroup *14 (2016), online at http:// 
floridapolitics.com/archives/tag/dependency-roles-workgroup (visited Dec 26, 2017) 
(Perma archive unavailable). In 2008, however, “the Department began implementing 
. . . the ‘prosecutorial model,’” in which “attorneys have described their allegiance pri-
marily to ‘the State of Florida,’ rather than to [the agency].” Id at *8. No legislation 
accompanied this shift, so it is not clear how the department justified it. By 2016, a 
state-sponsored report criticized this shift for resulting in lawyers making “decisions 
that more properly belong” to the agency. Id. 
 255 See HF 119 §§ 2–3, 2013 Iowa Acts 386, 386–87, codified at Iowa Code §§ 232.90, 
232.114. The legislation explicitly distinguishes representing the agency from represent-
ing the state, and followed lobbying by county attorneys to “restore the CA’s role as the 
independent voice of ‘the People’ in [Child in Need of Assistance] and [termination of pa-
rental rights] prosecutions.” Iowa Department of Human Services, Summary of Charge 
from House File 608 *3 (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/KN5Q-L2AG. The statute per-
mits the agency to seek intervention by the attorney general in case of “disagreement be-
tween the department and the county attorney.” Iowa Code § 232.90(3). 
 256 See generally Josh Gupta-Kagan, Where the Judiciary Prosecutes in Front of Itself: 
Missouri’s Unconstitutional Juvenile Court Structure, 78 Mo L Rev 1245 (2013). 
 257 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *33 (cited in note 19). 
 258 Supreme Court of Missouri, Re: Rule 14.01 Assignment of Judicial Personnel 
¶ 1(b) (Dec 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5ZQE-JZ5B. The amended version of the 
Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rules requires the separation of “the appointing au-
thority” for juvenile officers from juvenile judges who hear cases that those juvenile offic-
ers file. See Mo S Ct Operating Rule 14.01(b). 
 259 See Oregon Task Force Final Report at *24 (cited in note 251). 
 260 See id. 
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Five states reported some kind of hybrid system.261 (Not every 
state responded.) Most of these states reported that attorney gen-
eral or district attorney office lawyers represented the agency ra-
ther than the state. But several states reported that these attor-
neys had a “dual mandate”—to simultaneously represent the 
agency and the state as a whole.262 
A review of state statutes reveals divergent statutory struc-
tures. Eight states assign child protection agencies the authority 
to determine which cases to file (or at least permit anyone to file 
cases, including child protection agency staff),263 and those states 
give those agencies their own lawyers.264 Twenty-five states 
assign child protection agencies the authority to determine which 
cases to file, but assign lawyers from other executive-branch 
agencies to prosecute child protection cases.265 In such a structure, 
 
 261 See id (relaying that 80 percent of jurisdictions surveyed reported that the agency 
attorney represents the agency). 
 262 Id (“[Eight jurisdictions] reported either that the state was the agency (that these 
roles could not be bifurcated) or interpreted their state’s authorizing statute for govern-
ment representation to include a dual mandate.”). 
 263 See Ariz Rev Stat § 8-841 (permitting anyone, including the agency, to file peti-
tion); Ark Code Ann §§ 9-27-310(b)(2), 9-27-311(e)(2)(D); Fla Stat Ann § 39.501(1); Mass 
Gen Laws Ann ch 119, § 51B; NH Rev Stat Ann §§ 169-C:8-a, 169-C:18; 23 Pa Cons Stat 
Ann § 6370; RI Gen Laws § 40-11-7; SC Code Ann §§ 63-7-920, 63-7-1620(4), 63-7-1660. 
 264 Some of these states’ statutes specify that child protection agencies have their own 
lawyers. See, for example, Fla Stat Ann § 39.501(1); RI Gen Laws § 40-11-14. The other 
states listed in note 263 have reported that attorneys represent either state or county 
agencies. See Ruiz and Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representa-
tion Models at 9–10 (cited in note 228). 
 265 See Alaska Stat Ann § 47.10.020 (authorizing the department to file petitions); 
State of Alaska Department of Law, Civil Division (State of Alaska 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5WPC-3WNW (describing the Civil Division as providing legal services to 
the Department of Health and Social Services in child protection cases); Cal Welf & Inst 
Code §§ 325, 328; Colo Rev Stat Ann §§ 19-3-206, 19-3-501 (assigning the county attorney 
to represent the petitioner, and describing the investigation by the county department of 
social services as leading to a request to the court to “[a]uthorize a petition”); Conn Gen 
Stat Ann §§ 46b-121b(b), 46b-129(a); 10 Del Code Ann § 1003 (granting anyone, including 
agency staff, power to initiate cases); 29 Del Code Ann § 2505(b) (assigning to the attorney 
general the responsibility to appoint a state solicitor, who is responsible for cases involving 
state agencies); Ga Code Ann § 15-11-150 (granting Division of Family and Children 
Services employees or any person with actual knowledge of child abuse power to file peti-
tions); Georgia Department of Human Services, FAQ (State of Georgia), archived at 
http://perma.cc/XMJ8-KFPE (identifying special assistant attorneys general as legal rep-
resentatives in child protection cases); Haw Rev Stat § 571-62 (assigning the attorney gen-
eral to represent the agency); 705 ILCS Stat §§ 405/1-6, 405/2-13; Iowa Code Ann 
§§ 232.87(2), 232.90(2); 22 Me Rev Stat Ann, §§ 4004(2)(F), 4032; 5 Me Rev Stat Ann § 191; 
Md Family Law Code Ann § 5-710; Md Ct and Jud Proceedings Code Ann § 3-809; Mich 
Comp Laws Ann § 722.638; Minn Stat Ann §§ 260C.141(1), 260C.163(4); NJ Stat Ann 
§ 9:6-8.34 (giving the agency, the county prosecutor, and others power to file petitions); 
Department of Children and Families Practice Group (DCF) (State of New Jersey, Office 
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the agency is sometimes the client and thus has the authority to 
determine which cases to file, but representation through another 
elected official’s office could put that official’s imprint on intake 
decisions. Attorneys employed beyond the agency could further 
shape agency decisions when they are charged with representing 
the state generally or the public interest rather than the 
agency.266 In such cases, case workers will continue their work 
throughout a case, but the state’s attorney will not be obliged to 
represent only them or their agency’s position. Eleven states and 
the District of Columbia give an elected prosecutor or some other 
executive-branch lawyer authority to determine which cases to 
file.267 In such a model, the agency may still wield significant in-
fluence by choosing which cases to refer to the prosecuting attor-
ney and thus practically determining that many cases will not be 
 
of the Attorney General), archived at http://perma.cc/9YNS-VVQJ (explaining that the at-
torney general represents the New Jersey child protection agency); NY Fam Ct Law 
§§ 1032, 1038, 1048 (granting the child protection agency power to file petitions and ref-
erencing “corporation counsel, county attorney or district attorney” as lawyers for the 
state); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2151.27 (anyone, including the child protection agency, can 
file); Or Rev Stat § 419B.809 (permitting anyone, including the agency, to file petitions); 
Oregon Task Force Final Report at *26–27 (cited in note 251); SD Cod Laws §§ 26-7A-9 to 
26-7A-10; Tenn Code Ann §§ 37-1-119, 37-1-124 (permitting anyone with direct 
knowledge, who will typically be agency staff, to file petitions and assigning district attor-
neys or county attorneys to represent agency petitioners); Utah Code Ann §§ 62A-4a-113, 
78A-6-304; 33 Vt Stat Ann § 5309 (providing that the state’s attorney “shall prepare and 
file a petition” upon agency request); Va Code Ann § 16.1-260(A); Wash Rev Code 
§§ 13.04.093, 26.44.195; W Va Code §§ 49-4-501, 49-4-601; Wyo Stat Ann § 14-3-
204(a)(viii). Not every state statute specifies which attorneys represent the agency or 
state. California, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming have all reported via survey that executive-
branch attorneys outside of their child protection agencies provide representation. See 
Ruiz and Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models at 
9–10 (cited in note 228). 
 266 See, for example, Iowa Code Ann §§ 232.87(2), 232.90(1)–(2) (granting the agency 
authority to file petitions but directing that the county attorney “shall represent the state,” 
defined as “the general interest held by the people in the health, safety, welfare, and pro-
tection of all children living in this state”); Minn Stat § 260C.163(4) (providing that county 
attorneys represent both the agency and “the public interest in the welfare of the child”). 
Charging lawyers with representing dual clients—an agency and “the public interest”—
could raise ethical issues when those clients’ goals conflict. A full exploration of those eth-
ical issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 267 See DC Code § 16-2305(c)(1); Idaho Code §§ 16-1610, 16-1631; Kan Stat Ann §§ 38-
2214, 38-2230, 38-2233; Ky Rev Stat Ann §§ 610.030, 620.040 (“For a public offense com-
plaint, the matter shall be referred to the county attorney.”); Mont Code Ann § 41-3-422(2); 
Neb Rev Stat § 43-261; Nev Rev Stat § 432B.510(2); NM Stat Ann §§ 32A-1-6, 32A-4-15; 
NC Gen Stat Ann §§ 7B-401.1(a), 7B-302, 7B-305, 7B-306; ND Cent Code §§ 27-20-20, 27-
20-24(3); 10A Okla Stat Ann §§ 1-4-301(A), 1-4-501; Wis Stat § 48.25. 
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prosecuted.268 Some states vary by county or judicial circuit.269 
Three states give court-employed intake officers authority to ini-
tiate cases,270 but in one of those, case law suggests a greater role 
for child protection agencies,271 and the other notes a statutory 
role for the child protection agency and prosecutor.272 Several 
states’ statutes give both the child protection agency and prose-
cutors simultaneous authority to initiate cases.273 
As with juvenile delinquency cases,274 these statutes permit 
varying practices. It is likely in many jurisdictions that prosecu-
tors largely follow caseworker recommendations. In others, it is 
likely that agency authority is circumvented by bringing cases di-
rectly to prosecutors.275 A more precise accounting of practices 
across different jurisdictions remains a task for future research. 
C. Pre-Gault Vestiges 
Not only do states vary significantly in how their statutes 
structure family-court prosecutorial discretion, but vestiges of the 
pre-Gault era remain in the law and practice of many states. 
Missouri provides the most dramatic example: It has maintained 
its system of family-court-employed juvenile officers who deter-
mine which child protection and delinquency cases to file. Moreo-
ver, Missouri assigns attorneys (who were also employed by the 
family court) to those juvenile officers to prosecute cases; no 
 
 268 See, for example, Idaho Code § 16-1631. 
 269 Texas is the most prominent example. It permits a “governmental entity”—usually 
the child protection agency—to file child protection petitions. Tex Fam Code Ann 
§ 262.101. In more populated areas, the district or county attorney represents the agency, 
while in less populated areas, an agency employee represents the agency. See Ruiz and 
Trowbridge, National Survey of Child Welfare Legal Representation Models at 10 (cited in 
note 228). See also, for example, Wash Rev Code § 13.04.093 (providing that the attorney 
general represents the agency but may contract with county prosecuting attorneys in 
smaller counties). 
 270 See Ala Code Ann § 12-15-120; Miss Code Ann § 43-21-357; Mo Rev Stat 
§ 211.081(1). 
 271 See G.H. v Cleburne County Department of Human Resources, 62 S3d 540, 541, 
544 (Ala Civ App 2010) (reporting that the child protection agency “filed petitions,” which 
were “endorsed by” the juvenile-court officer). 
 272 See Miss Code Ann §§ 43-21-357, 43-21-451. 
 273 See Ind Code §§ 31-37-8-5, 31-37-8-6, 31-34-9-1; La Children’s Code Ann Art 631. 
 274 See text accompanying notes 244–45. 
 275 See Gupta-Kagan, 78 Mo L Rev at 1286 (cited in note 256) (describing how indi-
vidual child abuse and neglect reporters in Missouri may “circumvent” the child protection 
agency by referring cases directly to those with authority to file cases). 
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executive-branch agency or attorney has that role in either delin-
quency or child protection cases.276 
Two other vestiges exist in many more states. First, many 
states give anyone the right to initiate family-court proceedings 
in child protection cases,277 delinquency cases,278 or both.279 Such 
provisions go beyond individuals’ right to report a suspected 
crime to the police or suspected abuse or neglect to a child protec-
tion agency—it permits individuals to trigger the state’s coercive 
authority over other individuals in a public-law case, without a 
government official first determining that it serves the public in-
terest to do so. That is even broader than unlimited standing to 
bring private child-visitation cases, which the US Supreme Court 
has described as “breathtakingly broad.”280 Even if this historical 
feature of family courts has faded over time,281 such provisions are 
still sometimes used. In 2015, my clinic handled a case in which 
a teacher accused a student of an assault. A school resource officer 
had investigated, and neither she nor the school principal saw fit 
to refer the child to family court. The teacher went ahead and filed 
a petition, leading to several court dates—and risking the harms 
that come with haling a child into court282—before the prosecutor 
agreed to dismiss the case several days before trial.283 
Second, many states’ juvenile delinquency intake procedures 
continue to feature “court officers.”284 These individuals work for 
the same family-court judges who hear petitions; the court 
officers are thus placed in the wrong branch of government (the 
judiciary rather than the executive branch), and they are not 
 
 276 See id at 1245. The DOJ’s report on its investigation into the St. Louis County 
family court concluded that these juvenile officers created a “constitutionally flawed fam-
ily court structure.” See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *31–34 (cited 
in note 19). 
 277 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 9-27-310(b)(3)(A); Fla Stat Ann § 39.501(1); 705 
ILCS Stat 405/2-13(1); Kan Stat Ann § 38-2233; Ky Rev Stat Ann § 620.070(1); Or Rev 
Stat § 419B.809; W Va Code § 49-4-601(a). 
 278 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-1020. 
 279 See, for example, Ala Rule Juv Proc 12(A); 10 Del Code Ann § 1003; Minn Stat 
Ann §§ 260B.141(1), 260C.141(1); NH Rev Stat Ann §§ 169-B:6, 169-C:7; Ohio Rev Code 
§ 2151.27(A)(1); 23 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 6334(a); RI Gen Laws § 14-1-11(b); Tenn Code 
Ann § 37-1-119. 
 280 Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 67 (2000). 
 281 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 575 (cited in note 18). 
 282 See, for example, note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the association be-
tween court appearances and reduced high school graduation). 
 283 The child in this case became a client of the University of South Carolina Juvenile 
Justice Clinic, which I teach, and the Richland County Public Defender. 
 284 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576–77 (cited in note 18). 
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placed alongside an executive-branch agency and thus are not 
governed by state administrative law. The continued use of these 
court intake officers is troubling for several reasons. First, their 
placement in the judicial branch raises separation-of-powers con-
cerns; the independence of both the intake officer’s decision and 
the judge’s adjudication can reasonably be questioned when in-
take officers are employed by the family court.285 Second, separat-
ing the intake function from the postadjudication work of juvenile 
justice agencies prevents the creation of comprehensive juvenile 
justice agencies. The intake officers contributing to intake deci-
sions do not have responsibility for the consequences of those de-
cisions, a topic discussed in more depth in Part IV.B. 
D. A Need for Empirical Study 
The variety of statutory intake structures suggests the value 
of empirical research to investigate whether different intake 
structures lead to different results and, if so, what differences 
might result. There is currently a dearth of empirical studies ex-
ploring the impact of prosecutors’ role in intake decisions or how 
that role impacts racial disparities.286 Several colleagues and I are 
now comparing delinquency intake decisions in counties in which 
elected prosecutors’ offices make all intake decisions with deci-
sions in other counties in the same state287 in which state juvenile 
justice agency intake officers make recommendations to elected 
prosecutors. Our goal is to determine what effect, if any, such dif-
ferent intake practices have. Similar studies in both delinquency 
and child protection cases could empirically establish the im-
portance of intake structures and help policymakers reform or re-
fine existing structures. 
 
 285 For a fuller articulation of this argument, see generally Gupta-Kagan, 78 Mo L 
Rev 1245 (cited in note 256). 
 286 See James C. Howell, et al, Bulletin 5: Young Offenders and an Effective Response 
in the Juvenile and Adult Justice Systems—What Happens, What Should Happen, and 
What We Need to Know *6 (July 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/D98V-KDJN (“[W]e 
know very little about how race and ethnicity affect formal charging practices and plea 
negotiations.”); Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 576 (cited in note 18). 
 287 While the state laws surveyed in Part III.A apply throughout a state, practice un-
der such laws may vary within a state. See notes 244–45, 275 and accompanying text. Our 
study will control for between-county differences and child-specific differences to isolate 
any effects of different intake structures. 
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IV.  AN AGENCY MODEL FOR FAMILY-COURT PROSECUTORS 
Determining who should hold prosecutorial discretion in 
child protection and juvenile delinquency cases is an essential 
piece of a complete “constitutional domestication” of family 
courts.288 This domestication is not complete—vestigial officials 
remain in many states, as Part III.C shows. And where domesti-
cation has occurred, Parts III.A and III.B show that the field has 
not reached a consistent answer as to how to best structure pros-
ecutorial discretion. This Part argues that granting authority to 
child protection and juvenile justice agencies is the best means to 
structure family-court prosecutorial discretion. 
Assigning family-court prosecutors to represent agencies, 
and granting those agencies power to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion, would help the juvenile justice and child protection 
systems operate more consistently with their historical and 
statutory purposes. Child protection and delinquency law con-
tinue their historical focus on rehabilitation of offenders and 
emphasis on keeping children at home with their families. 
Agency control would avoid the likelihood that elected prosecu-
tors’ offices—especially in delinquency cases—impose an overly 
punitive view on intake decisions, and perhaps reverse the tough-
on-crime era spike in the proportion of cases prosecuted rather 
than dismissed or diverted.289 Both the structure and culture of 
elected prosecutors’ offices and those offices’ electoral incentives 
to appear tough on crime create tension with rehabilitative goals. 
Juvenile justice and child protection agencies have more infor-
mation about available resources and staff better trained in the 
fundamentals of child development, and thus they are better 
suited to decide when court intervention is beneficial and when 
some alternative course is preferred. 
An agency model can also lead to meaningful judicial review 
of charging decisions—a core and elusive goal of those studying 
criminal prosecutors—and achieve other systemic benefits. Un-
der current law, granting elected prosecutors charging discretion 
creates many of the same challenges with prosecutorial authority 
discussed in Part I.B. Such judicial review is an important check 
on prosecutors’ authority—one that is difficult to impose on crim-
inal cases but can more easily be lodged with family courts that 
review the agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
 
 288 Gault, 387 US at 22. 
 289 See text accompanying notes 22–23. 
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Finally, an agency model can help ensure greater democratic 
accountability, provide better counseling to these essential agen-
cies, and attain more consistent practice throughout a state. 
A. More Consistent with Statutory Purposes 
Family-court prosecutions are essential elements of juvenile 
justice and child protection systems that, by statute, emphasize 
rehabilitation. As commentators through family-court history 
have noted, this emphasis fundamentally differs from the crimi-
nal justice system. An agency charged with administering such a 
statute is better situated than elected prosecutors to apply such 
an emphasis. 
1. Different purposes from criminal prosecutions. 
Family-court prosecutorial discretion should vary from crim-
inal prosecutorial discretion because family-court cases have fun-
damentally different purposes. Criminal prosecutions vindicate 
the public’s interest in retribution for crimes and the deterrence 
of other crimes, while family courts continue to focus more on re-
habilitating children and their families. This difference is illus-
trated in case-naming conventions; while criminal cases are 
named as the state versus the defendant, both child protection 
and juvenile delinquency cases are captioned “In the matter of” or 
“In re” the child.290 
Child protection cases have no retributive purposes; the goal 
is to protect individual children, rehabilitate children and their 
caregivers, prevent the need for removing children even when 
parents have abused or neglected them, and reunify children with 
parents when they are separated. Federal law requires states to 
make efforts to achieve these goals as a condition of receiving fed-
eral funds.291 
Even in delinquency cases, punishing youth remains a lesser 
function when compared to rehabilitation, and, as a result, delin-
quency intake “contrasts markedly with criminal justice.”292 De-
terring youth is a much reduced if not eliminated goal due to de-
velopmental psychology that makes it difficult to deter 
 
 290 See generally, for example, Gault, 387 US at 1 (delinquency); In re Stanley, 256 NE2d 
814 (Ill 1970), revd and remd, Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645 (1972) (child protection). 
 291 See 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B). 
 292 Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 575 (cited in note 18). 
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teenagers.293 Much has been written about delinquency law’s shift 
away from rehabilitative and toward more punitive purposes 
through “tough-on-crime” reforms of the 1980s and 1990s,294 but 
the family court has largely retained rehabilitative goals in most 
cases it handles, especially for low-level offenses. Most tough-on-
crime reforms changed the boundaries of family court—expand-
ing situations in which authorities could waive children to be 
tried in adult court and subject to adult penalties—or otherwise 
toughened sanctions for relatively serious offenses. Such reforms 
do not affect allegations that a child committed a misdemeanor 
offense at school or committed any of the other relatively minor 
charges that are the most common delinquency charges.295 Re-
garding those charges, as discussed above,296 juvenile prosecutors 
increased the ratio of cases that they prosecuted as compared 
with those that were diverted—using prosecutorial discretion to 
create significant reform. 
Despite this increased likelihood to prosecute rather than di-
vert cases, states’ juvenile justice codes make clear that rehabili-
tation and accountability must be balanced. State laws describe 
children who commit crimes as those “in need of treatment or re-
habilitation”297 and describe the purpose of juvenile justice sys-
tems as to hold a child “accountable” for crimes, to focus on reha-
bilitation, and to apply justice based on an understanding of 
children’s development and various other social factors.298 Analyz-
ing the purpose clauses of states juvenile codes, the DOJ found 
only six states that it categorized as emphasizing public protec-
tion and accountability for children over rehabilitation.299 The 
 
 293 As the Supreme Court wrote in Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005), “the same 
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juve-
niles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id at 571, cited in Graham v Florida, 560 US 
48, 72 (2010), and Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 472 (2012). 
 294 See generally, for example, Feld, 84 Minn L Rev 327 (cited in note 173). 
 295 For instance, the most frequent charges in South Carolina family-court referrals 
in 2013–2014 were (in decreasing order) assault and battery third degree, disturbing 
schools, shoplifting, public disorderly conduct, simple possession of marijuana, truancy, 
probation violation, and contempt of court. See 2014–2015 Annual Statistical Report at 
*13 (cited in note 34). 
 296 See notes 187–90 and accompanying text. 
 297 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-1-20(B). 
 298 See, for example, DC Code § 16-2301.02. 
 299 The six states are Connecticut, Hawaii, North Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. 
See Juvenile Justice System Structure & Process, Organization and Administration of Delin-
quency Services (OJJDP), archived at http://perma.cc/CPR5-VUNF. 
2018] Rethinking Family-Court Prosecutors 801 
 
vast majority emphasized a balance between those goals and re-
habilitation—if not a tilt toward the latter.300 
If anything, the pendulum is swinging back toward rehabili-
tation as the juvenile justice system’s central purpose, informed 
by a deeper understanding of adolescent development.301 The 
Supreme Court’s string of “children are different” cases has de-
fined twenty-first-century juvenile justice reform trends.302 
Through five cases, the Court emphasized what adolescent psy-
chology has taught us about teenagers’ mental and emotional de-
velopment. That children differ significantly from adults, and 
that legal rules applied to children must therefore differ, is now a 
“commonsense reality.”303 In particular, children are less culpable 
than adults, less likely to be deterred, and more likely to be reha-
bilitated.304 While the Court’s discussion was in the context of 
Eighth Amendment cases challenging the most severe criminal 
sentences imposed on children convicted of the most serious 
crimes, there is no logical principle that distinguishes minor of-
fenses in family court. And policy reforms consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s “children are different” cases have covered mi-
nor offenses. For instance, states have expanded family-court ju-
risdiction in recent years, primarily by raising the maximum age 
at which a child can be tried in family court.305 
 
 300 See id. The National Juvenile Defender Center reached the same conclusion and 
provided statutory excerpts. National Juvenile Defender Center, Comparative & Multi-
jurisdiction Data: Juvenile Justice Purpose Clauses—Multi-jurisdiction Survey (Jan 
2014), online at http://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/multi-jurisdiction 
-data/ (visited Dec 27, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 301 See, for example, Sayali Himanshu Bapat and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Is 
There Justice for Juveniles in the United States, India, and Italy?: Towards a Framework 
for Transnational Comparisons, in Tamar R. Birckhead and Solange Mouthaan, eds, The 
Future of Juvenile Justice: Procedure and Practice from a Comparative Perspective 37, 45–
46 (Carolina 2016). 
 302 The “children are different” quote comes from Miller, 567 US at 480. The other 
cases are Roper, 543 US 551; Graham, 560 US 48; J.D.B. v North Carolina, 564 US 261 
(2011); and Montgomery v Louisiana, 136 S Ct 718 (2016). 
 303 See J.D.B., 564 US at 265. J.D.B. made a point to emphasize that the law has long 
treated children differently, that these differences apply across a wide range of legal areas, 
and that such differences are a “settled understanding.” Id at 262. 
 304 See, for example, Miller, 567 US at 571. 
 305 This trend is illustrated at Jurisdictional Boundaries (Juvenile Justice GPS), 
online at http://www.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable). This website excludes two states that recently expanded family-court 
jurisdiction. See SB 324, 2016 La Sess Law Serv 521, codified at La Children’s Code 
Art 804(1); Act No 268 § 2, 2016 SC Acts & Resol 1751, 1752–53 (including a statutory 
provision to take effect, per § 12, in 2019). 
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A related difference between adult criminal court and family-
court delinquency and child protection cases are that the latter 
are confidential while criminal cases explicitly seek to blame 
criminals publicly as one tool to punish, shame, and deter crime. 
While juvenile delinquency proceedings are less confidential than 
they used to be,306 they are still generally closed proceedings,307 
and juveniles’ names are still mostly shielded from public view. 
Confidentiality’s historical purpose has been to promote the fam-
ily court’s rehabilitative purposes and to shield children and fam-
ilies from the stigma of public disclosure,308 a purpose Gault ex-
plicitly recognized.309 
2. Elected prosecutors’ offices are not structured to apply a 
rehabilitative statute. 
For a child who is repeatedly unruly, when is a school inter-
vention, the provision of services from other agencies, or a diver-
sion program more effective than prosecution in court? For par-
ents who abuse substances and are abused by a partner and 
neglect their children as a result, when is court intervention nec-
essary and when can less invasive steps work? There is little in-
herent in an elected prosecutor’s role or training that helps an-
swer these questions. Worse, granting this power to elected 
prosecutors can undermine the juvenile justice and child protec-
tion law’s rehabilitative purposes. 
Locating charging decisions in elected prosecutors’ offices 
likely leads to the overvaluation of punitive or deterrence goals 
and the subordination of rehabilitative goals in both delinquency 
and child protection systems, though it arises more frequently in 
the juvenile delinquency context. There, the status quo’s empow-
erment of elected prosecutors’ offices—and disempowerment of 
juvenile justice agencies—threatens what Justice White called 
 
 306 Many have criticized policy reforms that have edged away from confidential-
ity. See generally, for example, Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in 
Delinquency Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be 
Notified?, 79 NYU L Rev 520 (2004). 
 307 See id at 536 (noting that, while increasing exceptions exist, “almost every state 
still has some statutory provision for the confidentiality of juvenile hearings and records”); 
Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 394 (cited in note 10) (noting that most juvenile delinquency 
cases remain closed, with exceptions often limited to more serious charges). 
 308 See Henning, 79 NYU L Rev at 527–30 (cited in note 306). 
 309 See Gault, 387 US at 25. Gault did recognize that delinquency adjudications stig-
matize youth, id at 22–24, and child protection cases similarly stigmatize families, but 
that stigma is a consequence, not a purpose of family-court cases. 
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the juvenile system’s unique ability to check “overzealous prose-
cutor[s].”310 White wrote in an era before prosecutors gained 
charging authority—and his concern is particularly strong now 
that they have largely done so. 
Elected prosecutors generally work to prosecute and convict 
individuals for criminal offenses. The National District Attorneys 
Association described elected prosecutors’ “primary responsibil-
ity” as serving as “an independent administrator of justice”—fo-
cusing on “accountab[ility]” for the guilty and “protect[ion]” for 
the innocent.311 Their guidelines for juvenile prosecutors’ charging 
decisions differ only modestly from adult guidelines.312 The guide-
lines acknowledge the value of “the special interests and needs of 
the juvenile,” but make clear that juvenile prosecutors’ “primary 
duty . . . is to seek justice,” and rehabilitating children exists only 
as a secondary goal, and only so long as it does not “unduly com-
promise[e]” their primary duty.313 
Prosecutors’ close relationships with police departments of-
ten furthers this punitive orientation. Police officers are trained 
to investigate and enforce the law; they are not trained to deter-
mine which children can be served through school interventions 
and which through juvenile justice interventions. Several studies 
have documented in the child protection context that “police have 
a more punitive attitude” than other categories of professionals.314 
Vesting control in elected prosecutors risks overreliance on the 
views of law enforcement officers in charging decisions, and too 
little reliance on individuals with a statutorily mandated rehabil-
itation orientation. 
 
 310 See text accompanying note 94. 
 311 National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards 1-1.1 at 
*2 (3d ed 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/MZ4S-RHPD. 
 312 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 438 (cited in note 10). 
 313 See National Prosecution Standards 4-11.1 at *64 (cited in note 311). See also id 
4-11.8 at *65 (“[T]he primary concern of the prosecutor should be protection of the public 
interest.”); id 4-11.10 at *66 (providing that disposition recommendations should serve 
children’s needs only to the extent that “they are consistent with community safety and 
welfare”). 
 314 Theodore P. Cross, David Finkelhor, and Richard Ormrod, Police Involvement in 
Child Protective Services Investigations: Literature Review and Secondary Data Analysis, 
10 Child Maltreatment 224, 231 (2005) (discussing prior studies). Professors Theodore P. 
Cross, David Finkelhor, and Richard Ormrod largely studied police involvement in child 
protection investigations rather than their less frequent involvement in deciding whether 
to remove children. See id at 237 (reporting rates of police involvement in investigation 
and the “[p]lan/placement decision”). 
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Some elected prosecutors’ offices further that punitive orien-
tation through various management practices. Some offices deter-
mine promotions and salaries in part based on the convictions 
won by line prosecutors—leaving little career benefit for an indi-
vidual prosecutor who declines to prosecute children for petty of-
fenses that could be addressed through means other than the 
family court.315 Some prosecutors who espoused a less punitive 
approach to their jobs have expressed concern that such views 
would impair their career trajectories.316 Some offices use the 
number of dismissals as a means to measure attorneys’ perfor-
mance317—a measure that discourages dismissals, even when sup-
ported by a reasoned conclusion that diversion would better reha-
bilitate the child than prosecution. Such measures are 
particularly inappropriate in states in which any individual can 
make referrals318 because the different pool of referrals may have 
a different proportion of meritorious cases than the adult criminal 
system. Many offices lack attorneys devoted to juvenile cases, in-
stead filling these positions with new attorneys seeking promo-
tion to an adult criminal docket319—which they earn through high 
conviction numbers rather than exercising charging discretion.320 
In addition to different office cultures, prosecutors are not 
professionally trained to analyze the various social factors that 
should drive family-court charging decisions. Determining 
whether prosecution is warranted in any given case requires iden-
tification of the root causes of concerning behavior and evaluation 
of alternative interventions, a determination that benefits from a 
strong understanding of adolescent development, mental health 
 
 315 See Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 434 (cited in note 10); Bishop and Frazier, 5 
Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 301 (cited in note 63) (“All too frequently juvenile 
divisions are places of first assignment for newly hired assistant state attorneys who even-
tually move on to the more prestigious criminal divisions.”). 
 316 See Bishop and Frazier, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 298 n 51 (cited in 
note 63). 
 317 See, for example, National District Attorneys Association, American Prosecutors 
Research Institute, Performance Measures for Prosecutors, Findings from the Application 
of Performance Measures in Two Prosecutors’ Offices *2 (2007), archived at 
http://perma.cc/D3MP-Z9PR. This report called for further study of measurements related 
to dismissals, such as the ratio of convictions to cases charged. Id at *14. 
 318 See text accompanying notes 277–79. 
 319 This practice is disfavored by the National District Attorneys Association. See 
National Prosecution Standards 4-11.3 at *64 (cited in note 311). 
 320 See Anna VanCleave, Brady and the Juvenile Courts, 38 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 
551, 557 (2014). 
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conditions,321 and family functioning. Assessing such factors is 
“far more fitting for a probation officer than for prosecutor in-
quiry.”322 Some prosecutors have acknowledged that they are “ill 
prepared” for the task of determining which teenagers require 
prosecution, which may need diversion, and which require no 
court intervention at all.323 These points are even more true in 
child protection cases, in which determining which cases to pros-
ecute requires distinguishing children who are so in danger that 
they require removal from children whose families can safely care 
for them with some less coercive intervention, and attorneys lack 
training in the relevant principles of child development or family 
dynamics.324 
Locating prosecutorial discretion with agencies provides con-
trasts on all points. Agency attorneys are “likely to be committed 
to the agency’s particular substantive mission,”325 which promi-
nently features rehabilitation. Juvenile justice agencies are more 
likely to be focused on rehabilitation. A juvenile justice agency 
lawyer’s career should not depend on a simple win–loss record or 
number of cases filed or dismissed. For agencies, success (and 
therefore good lawyering and a lawyer’s promotion) should look 
different. Professors Neal Devins and Michael Herz suggest that 
success for a lawyer representing an agency should be measured 
by success of the agency’s overall mission and any relevant policy 
agenda.326 Defining precise metrics for juvenile justice and child 
protection agency lawyers is beyond the scope of this Article. It 
suffices to point out that such metrics should include measures, 
such as recidivism rates of individual defendants (both among 
children diverted and prosecuted), that are central to agencies’ 
rehabilitative missions. 
 
 321 For example, one recent study found that the prosecution of first-time offenders is 
associated with higher rates of reoffending, except for children “diagnosed with an 
aggression-related mental disorder.” See Barrett and Katsiyannis, 26 J Child & Fam Stud 
at 2051–52 (cited in note 26). 
 322 Rubin, 26 Crime & Delinq at 304 (cited in note 84). 
 323 Reich, 14 Gonzaga L Rev at 349 (cited in note 167). 
 324 See Herring, 24 U Toledo L Rev at 624 (cited in note 213). See also Brooke N. 
Silverthorn, Agency Representation in Child Welfare Proceedings, in Donald N. Duquette, 
Ann M. Haralambie, and Vivek S. Sankaran, eds, Child Welfare Law and Practice: 
Representing Children, Parents, and State Agencies in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
Cases 751, 754 (National Association of Counsel for Children 3d ed 2016) (cautioning that 
prosecutors “with little or no training or specialized knowledge in child welfare” should 
not make decisions about which children to remove or cases to file). 
 325 Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: Governmental Role of the Agency General 
Counsel, in Clayton, ed, Government Lawyers 143, 143 (cited in note 71). 
 326 Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 588 (cited in note 67). 
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B. Structured to Coordinate Intake Decisions and Systemic 
Goals 
Administrative agencies perform essential work in the child 
protection and juvenile justice systems, and are best situated to 
consider legal and nonlegal factors to determine if a court case 
serves particular children’s interests. Most importantly, agencies 
have the capacity to connect intake decisions with services avail-
able for particular children and families and thus are best situ-
ated to apply the system’s goals in a coherent and pragmatic 
manner. 
Relatedly, an agency model aligns the costs of bringing a 
case—supervising a child on probation or taking care of a child 
committed to a child protection or juvenile justice agency’s 
custody—with the authority to initiate these cases. Professor 
John Pfaff has argued that the ability of elected criminal prose-
cutors to send individuals to prison without paying the costs of 
housing prisoners creates problems with prosecutors’ decisions in 
the criminal justice system, and he recommends making elected 
prosecutors pay some of those costs.327 Because child protection 
and juvenile justice agencies have such large roles in family-court 
cases—comparatively larger than departments of correction—
assigning them intake authority represents a simpler reform 
than Pfaff ’s proposal to split costs between prosecutors and prison 
agencies. 
1. Child protection agencies. 
Child protection agencies should exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion because they have comparatively greater ability to deter-
mine which children and families would most benefit from court 
involvement. Modern child protection agencies operate compre-
hensive systems. They manage child protection hotlines and de-
termine which reports of child maltreatment can lead immedi-
ately to provision of services on a voluntary basis (known as 
differential response) and which need investigation. These agen-
cies’ investigations substantiate some allegations of maltreat-
ment, and then these agencies determine which families with 
such substantiations would benefit from voluntary services and 
which need court involvement. The child protection agencies 
themselves also operate foster care systems—so they know what 
 
 327 Pfaff, Locked In at 142–43, 213–14 (cited in note 58). 
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placements and services are available if they seek a court order 
transferring custody to them. They thus have a unique ability to 
determine which cases would most benefit from court interven-
tion—and which families the agency is not likely able to help. 
An agency’s specialized knowledge of its own services reflects 
one purpose of separation of powers articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Heckler v Chaney,328 especially when litigation is one tool 
in a complicated regulatory system: 
[A]n agency decision not to enforce often involves a compli-
cated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly 
within its expertise. Thus, the agency must not only assess 
whether a violation has occurred, but whether agency re-
sources are best spent on this violation or another, whether 
the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particu-
lar enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s over-
all policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has enough re-
sources to undertake the action at all.329 
Applying the Heckler principle to child protection cases is 
straightforward. State child protection agencies operate compre-
hensive child protection systems and are in the best position to 
determine “whether agency resources are best spent on this vio-
lation or another,” and whether a family-court prosecution or 
some other agency action is most effective. Prosecutors working 
in such agencies must soon learn how to help counsel their agency 
clients to balance their competing goals and make intake deci-
sions consistent with their policy priorities. 
2. Juvenile justice agencies. 
Similar arguments support granting juvenile justice agencies 
charging authority and assigning family-court prosecutors to rep-
resent them. Juvenile justice agencies have a strong understand-
ing of child development. Agencies employ social workers and psy-
chologists, whose professional training includes adolescent 
development. These agencies are thus more likely to follow devel-
opmental psychology that suggests that some petty misbehavior 
does not require rehabilitative services at all—if it is normal teen-
age behavior—or requires some intervention other than coercive 
 
 328 470 US 821 (1985). 
 329 Id at 831. Heckler involved an effort to force the Food and Drug Administration to 
regulate drugs used by states in lethal injections. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld 
the agency’s ability to decline to regulate those drugs. Id at 837–38. 
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court-imposed services. Professor Henning has compellingly 
called on prosecutors to “collaborate with developmental experts 
and community representatives to draft intake and charging 
standards” that can provide a check on implicit bias and resulting 
racial disparities and “are informed by research in adolescent de-
velopment.”330 The DOJ has recommended applying trauma 
screens during juvenile delinquency intake to identify children 
whose offenses may result from a trauma disorder.331 Performing 
these interdisciplinary functions within an agency charged with 
understanding and following the state of the field knowledge in 
adolescent development will help socialize prosecutors to balance 
all of the agency’s competing goals. That would contrast positively 
with many elected prosecutors’ offices that, as discussed above, 
are institutionally primed to give disproportionate consideration 
to factors weighing in favor of prosecution and are not generally 
trained in relevant social science knowledge. 
An agency model must overcome two obstacles unique to ju-
venile justice law. First, most states lack a comprehensive agency 
to handle juvenile justice cases from charging decisions through 
postdisposition sentences. Some states, such as South Carolina, 
grant their departments a specific role during intake.332 In most 
states, however, they are juvenile probation staffers who are not 
affiliated with the agency that would take custody of children af-
ter an adjudication.333 As discussed in Part III.A, many states 
maintain a role for probation or intake officers, including those 
employed in the judicial branch. These pre-Gault relics often take 
on roles in juvenile delinquency cases that have largely been 
assigned to child protection agencies. 
This split between intake departments and postadjudication 
service agencies makes little sense, and those functions should be 
merged into a more comprehensive juvenile justice agency. Com-
prehensive juvenile justice agencies would likely bring a more 
balanced perspective to charging decisions and thus better fulfill 
the juvenile justice system’s purposes. Those agencies are 
charged with providing rehabilitative services to children who are 
adjudicated delinquent, and so have a unique ability to determine 
 
 330 Henning, 98 Cornell L Rev at 387, 457 (cited in note 10). 
 331 See Robert L. Listenbee Jr, et al, Report of the Attorney General’s National Task 
Force on Children Exposed to Violence *176–77 (OJJDP, 2012), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LP45-JM99. 
 332 See SC Code Ann § 63-19-1010. 
 333 See, for example, 10A Okla Stat Ann § 2-2-104. 
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which children are most in need of such services and which chil-
dren are better served by other entities. 
Such unified juvenile justice agencies would finally correct 
the historical treatment of family courts as judicial-branch agen-
cies. Early family courts sought to provide services to juvenile 
delinquents—consistent with the court’s assumption of executive-
branch charging authority, the court assumed executive-branch 
authority to provide services to children under its jurisdiction.334 
A sociologist studying the family court in the mid-1960s (before 
Gault) described it as an administrative agency whose role was 
shifting to become a more traditional court.335 Others described 
the family court’s intake function as “[r]eflecting the sociolegal 
character of the court” and as a mix of “case screening and ac-
ceptance procedures of welfare agencies” and adult-criminal-
court charging procedures.336 By the time of Gault, however, ob-
servers recognized that the job of providing services had shifted 
away from courts to growing executive-branch agencies, such as 
juvenile justice, mental health, and child welfare agencies.337 Soon 
after Gault, authorities advocated for more formally placing such 
authority in the executive branch. In 1979, the ABA recom-
mended shifting all juvenile delinquency intake efforts to the ex-
ecutive branch, in part to locate intake decisions in the same 
branch of government that was providing services.338 The ABA 
recognized that judges were not well suited to administer social 
services339 and that concentrating these services in the executive 
branch would improve the variety and coordination of services of-
fered.340 Moreover, judges should be independent of the agencies—
especially when those agencies must comply with judges’ orders 
 
 334 See Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 9–10 (cited in note 14). 
 335 See Lemert, 1967 Wis L Rev at 423 (cited in note 116). 
 336 Rosenheim and Skoler, 11 Crime & Delinq at 168–69 (cited in note 91). 
 337 See, for example, Robert D. Vinter, The Constitutional Responsibilities of Court-
Related Personnel, in Virginia Davis Nordin, ed, GAULT: What Now for the Juvenile Court 
119, 122 (Institute of Continuing Legal Education 1968) (“There has been an expansion of 
welfare service programs apart from the court . . . . Except in certain states the court is no 
longer a major source of public services available to youth in trouble.”); Robert D. Vinter, 
The Juvenile Court as an Institution, in Task Force Report 84, 84–85 (cited in note 86) 
(noting the family court’s dependence on various local agencies and organizations); 
Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts at 11 (cited in note 14) (recommend-
ing against court administration of social services for children). 
 338 See Standards Relating to Court Organization and Administration at 15 (cited in 
note 148). 
 339 See id at 15. The ABA approved the standards in 1979. Id at v. 
 340 Id at 1, 16–17. 
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about services provided to children.341 Subsequently, state depart-
ments of juvenile justice were responsible for children’s cases 
postdisposition, but intake services followed a different path, of-
ten remaining in the judicial branch while much authority shifted 
to local prosecutors’ offices. 
Intake and postadjudication services should be unified in one 
agency. Intake decisions require determining which children are 
most appropriate for the specific rehabilitative services offered by 
juvenile justice agencies and which can be served through other 
programs. As Heckler suggested, answering that question as ac-
curately as possible should involve considering the full range of 
interventions available, and whether charging specific children 
would lead to an efficient allocation of scarce agency resources. 
Unified juvenile justice agencies would be the entities best suited 
to determine whether a child’s case should be dismissed, referred 
to a diversion program (which the agency may operate, directly or 
through a contractor), or prosecuted (and thus subject to an 
agency placement or agency probation supervision if convicted). 
A second challenge is that police departments, and not juve-
nile justice agencies, investigate children suspected of committing 
crimes and refer suspects to the juvenile justice system—in con-
trast to child protection agencies, which investigate child abuse 
and neglect allegations. Still, this difference does not justify deny-
ing prosecutorial discretion to juvenile justice agencies. The pur-
poses of family-court prosecutions remain focused on rehabilita-
tion. So long as that is true, the agency providing rehabilitation 
services is best positioned to determine which cases to file. 
3. Elected prosecutors’ control risks inhibiting agency 
coordination. 
Elected prosecutors’ authority over charging decisions can 
harm juvenile justice and child protection agencies’ ability to pro-
vide rehabilitative services effectively. Granting prosecutorial 
discretion to elected prosecutors, or even to judicial-branch intake 
officers, gives those entities control over how many children de-
partments of juvenile justice must serve after adjudication. Those 
agencies do not control their “front door,”342 which could lead to 
overcrowded juvenile facilities and probation dockets. An agency 
that has reached its capacity for effective services to children in 
 
 341 Id at 15–16. 
 342 Alexander S. v Boyd, 876 F Supp 773, 781–82 (D SC 1995). 
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custody or on probation cannot adjust intake decisions accord-
ingly; they must take whatever children are ordered into their 
custody or supervision. The result can be overcrowded juvenile 
facilities or overburdened foster care systems, and their many 
correlated problems.343 Depriving agencies of charging authority 
empowers others to effectively make policy decisions about the 
allocation of agency resources.344 That is precisely what occurs 
when nonagency attorneys decide to prosecute a child protection 
or delinquency case without bearing responsibility for the conse-
quences in terms of agency resources. 
4. Agency interests will more likely coincide with statutory 
mandates. 
One risk in giving agencies control over which cases to pros-
ecute is that they may make decisions based on their own 
interests—trying to shift cases for which they should take respon-
sibility onto other agencies or prosecuting cases as a means to use 
(and not lose) available resources. While both concerns are legiti-
mate, the incentives created by an agency model would correct 
problems in the existing system. An agency that would be respon-
sible for a child adjudicated delinquent can push back against ef-
forts by other agencies to lead to an adjudication. And legislative 
decisions on resource allocation to particular agencies would be 
tied to agency decisions about when to use them. 
Agencies may attempt to pin responsibility for responding to 
particular cases on other agencies, and thus they would allow 
some children and families to escape warranted interventions. A 
juvenile justice agency, for instance, might decline to prosecute a 
child by insisting that a mental health agency or school provide 
some sort of intervention first. While such action in individual 
cases will surely sometimes be inappropriate, empowering a juve-
nile justice agency to engage in such efforts will pressure other 
agencies to more effectively assist such children. Indeed, there is 
a striking inequity under present law—schools, as well as mental 
health (and other) agencies, can disclaim responsibility for diffi-
cult teenagers and ask elected prosecutors to seek delinquency 
 
 343 Indeed, the Alexander S. reference to the South Carolina Department of Juvenile 
Justice not controlling its front door explained that the Department of Juvenile Justice 
was not entirely at fault for the gross overcrowding and related troubles documented in 
that case. Id. 
 344 See Devins, Toward an Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent 
Agencies at 185 (cited in note 71). 
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charges. Research into the school-to-prison pipeline has identified 
this phenomenon.345 If juvenile justice agencies are not included 
in the prosecutors’ decisions, or have only a weak voice in those 
decisions, they cannot effectively argue that schools or other 
agencies should do more before invoking the juvenile justice sys-
tem. The juvenile justice system thus becomes too easy of a sys-
tem to enter—and erodes the family court’s historical place as “an 
agency of last resort” for children whose behavior cannot be man-
aged elsewhere.346 As Judge David Bazelon wrote regarding sta-
tus offenders a generation ago, “[B]ecause you [family courts] 
act, no one else does. Schools and public agencies refer their 
problem cases to you because you have jurisdiction, because you 
exercise it, and because you hold out promises that you can pro-
vide solutions.”347 
The flip side of this concern is that if an agency has a budget 
for a particular amount of services—such as placements in group 
homes for foster or delinquent children—it may feel pressured to 
prosecute enough cases to utilize all of those services lest the 
agency lose budget allocations for such services. Such concerns 
are relatively unlikely to play out in practice, at least so long as 
child protection and juvenile justice agencies face meager budget 
allocations. More broadly, the resource constraints imposed on 
agency decisionmaking come with important benefits. These con-
siderations force agencies to prioritize cases for available re-
sources, consistent with Heckler, and thus the legislature’s 
budget allocations can be treated as judgments about the scope of 
necessary intervention. It is better for agencies to exercise prose-
cutorial discretion in explicit consideration of those judgments 
than for elected prosecutors to do so at a significant distance from 
those budgetary realities. 
C. More Effective Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion 
A primary benefit of administrative exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion is that agency decisions can be subject to some forms of 
 
 345 For instance, an ABA report on the school-to-prison pipeline outlines pervasive 
beliefs that many children will not succeed in school and details a series of discretionary 
decisions that build from academic failures to school discipline to juvenile justice system 
involvement. See Redfield and Nance, School-to-Prison Pipeline Preliminary Report at 
*18–22 (cited in note 29). 
 346 Lemert, The Juvenile Court—Quest and Realities at 96 (cited in note 86). 
 347 David L. Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv Ct Judges J 
42, 44 (1970). 
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judicial review. Some commentators have called recently for 
judges, rather than prosecutors, to have power to determine 
which cases to prosecute and which to divert, but without explain-
ing why a return to judicial control is best or identifying a legal 
structure for judges to make such decisions.348 This Section spells 
out how an agency model can support a clearer structure for judi-
cial review of charging decisions. Such review would be generally 
deferential yet more meaningful than the limited tools available 
to check the discretion of elected prosecutors. 
1. Arbitrary-and-capricious review of an agency decision to 
charge rather than divert. 
Prosecutorial discretion should not be boundless. Criminal 
justice reform efforts have struggled to identify meaningful 
checks on prosecutorial discretion, a difficulty that has largely ex-
tended into family court, because the law is extremely hesitant to 
question the charging decisions of elected criminal prosecutors.349 
Scholars have called for judicial review of criminal prosecutors’ 
decisions for generations,350 and some describe it as an “ideal” re-
form idea that has nonetheless failed to gain traction in criminal 
court.351 Family court, however, should be different. If family-
court prosecutors represent agencies charged with multiple goals, 
including both public safety and rehabilitation of children who 
have committed crimes and parents who have abused or neglected 
their children, judicial review could ensure some consideration of 
those goals. 
The basic administrative structure would begin with a child 
protection or juvenile justice agency promulgating standards for 
intake decisions. At least three states and the District of 
Columbia have already done so for delinquency cases by statute 
or court rule.352 These factors include various details about the 
child’s alleged offense—whether it includes violence or a weapon 
 
 348 David R. Katner, Delinquency, Due Process, and Mental Health: Presuming Youth 
Incompetency, in Nancy E. Dowd, ed, A New Juvenile Justice System: Total Reform for a 
Broken System 104, 117 (NYU 2015). 
 349 See Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 869, 874–87 (cited in note 58). 
 350 See, for example, Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary 
Inquiry 207–14 (LSU 1969). 
 351 See Barkow, 61 Stan L Rev at 908 (cited in note 58). 
 352 See DC Code § 16-2305.02(c) (listing factors to consider); Cal Ct Rule 5.516 (same); 
Neb Rev Stat § 43-276(1) (same); NH Rev Stat Ann § 169-B:10 (requiring delinquency pe-
titions to “identify why diversion was not an appropriate disposition prior to seeking court 
involvement,” but not providing standards for rejecting diversion). 
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and “the ages and circumstances of any others involved in the 
offense”—and whether the child has committed any prior of-
fenses.353 More severe charges and allegations that a child is a re-
peat offender should increase the likelihood of prosecution. Simi-
lar factors should apply in child protection cases—agencies 
should more frequently prosecute cases involving more severe 
and repeated instances of abuse or neglect, and cases that present 
immediate safety risks to children. Agencies could also use risk 
assessments to identify children who pose particularly high risks 
of future offenses or who are at particularly high risk of harm if 
left at home, although a full examination of the benefits and risks 
of such tools is beyond the scope of this Article.354 
Agencies should also consider specific factors relating to 
whether prosecuting a particular child or parent serves family 
courts’ purposes. In juvenile delinquency cases, agencies should 
consider a child’s family circumstances, any mental health or sub-
stance abuse history related to the alleged offense, and any disa-
bilities that would trigger special education protections related to 
the alleged offense355—and whether other agencies have provided 
appropriate services for such needs. For instance, if a child’s men-
tal health condition or other disability leads to behavior at school 
that is the root of a delinquency charge, then the agency should 
consider if the school has provided appropriate special education 
services, and whether the child has had an opportunity to access 
mental health services. Negative answers weigh in favor of dis-
missing or diverting such charges. Analogous standards should 
 
 353 Neb Rev Stat § 43-276(1)(b), (d), (l). See also, for example, DC Code § 16-2305.02(c)(2). 
 354 For instance, Professor Edward P. Mulvey and Anne-Marie R. Iselin report that 
actuarial risk assessments more accurately predict risk of future crimes than clinical 
methods but that such tools are also designed to overidentify risks, requiring “structured 
clinical judgment” to screen out those false positives. Edward P. Mulvey and Anne-Marie 
R. Iselin, Improving Professional Judgments of Risk and Amenability in Juvenile Justice, 
18 Future of Children 35, 40–41 (Fall 2008). See also Christopher E. Church and Amanda 
J. Fairchild, In Search of a Silver Bullet: Child Welfare’s Embrace of Predictive Analytics, 
68 Juv & Fam Ct J 67, 68 (Mar 2017) (discussing how “[predictive analytics] have the 
capacity to use data to help professionals make decisions more accurately, objectively and 
quickly,” but recognizing concerns about “discriminatory practices or consequences”). 
Skeptics have criticized how specific agencies have crafted risk assessments in a manner 
that validates existing practices. See Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks out of Child Pro-
tection Risk Analysis, 21 J L & Pol 5, 26–27 (2012). See also Tamar R. Birckhead, The 
Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 BC L Rev 379, 
416–18 (2017) (summarizing the debate over risk assessments in juvenile and criminal 
justice). 
 355 See Willis, 2016 BYU Educ & L J at 202–07 (cited in note 62). 
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apply in child protection cases—if a parent’s mental health con-
dition leads to abuse or neglect, agencies should consider whether 
offering such services to the parent without going to court could 
adequately rehabilitate the parent and protect the child. In both 
delinquency and child protection cases, agencies should also con-
sider the likelihood that a child or parent will participate in reha-
bilitative services without a court order.356 Agencies may also con-
sider standards that distinguish different populations or types of 
child maltreatment or delinquency. In child protection law, for in-
stance, Professor Michael Wald has discussed different standards 
for when removal and court action are required, distinguishing 
very young children at risk of significant harm from cases of fam-
ily conflict involving older children.357 In delinquency, agencies 
could analogously treat twelve-year-olds (relatively young for the 
delinquency system) differently from seventeen-year-olds, as well 
as differentiate among children committing property, drug, or 
other offenses. 
Applying such standards in individual cases, agency staff and 
attorneys would determine whether particular cases are (a) le-
gally sufficient and (b) worth filing because, under those agency 
standards, court intervention rather than another step serves the 
mix of rehabilitative and other goals of child protection and juve-
nile justice law. Establishing such clear standards would itself 
provide a significant benefit by reducing some of the wide discre-
tion that would otherwise exist358 and by eliminating practices 
that, for instance, automatically prosecute felony charges without 
considering legal sufficiency or other rehabilitative options.359 
Litigants in an ensuing case could seek dismissal of the case 
if the agency arbitrarily and capriciously applied its standards. 
Such review would provide significant deference to the agency’s 
charging decision while still helping to ensure that agencies are 
actually reviewing each case and considering all appropriate fac-
tors. An agency failing to consider specified standards adequately 
should justify dismissal. Consider two examples: In juvenile jus-
tice, a particularly important example involves school-based of-
fenses committed by children with disabilities; when provision of 
special education services—either any services when schools have 
 
 356 See, for example, DC Code § 16-2305.02(c)(4). 
 357 See Michael S. Wald, New Directions for Foster Care Reform, 68 Juv & Fam Ct J 
7, 25–28 (Mar 2017). 
 358 See Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 181–83 (cited in note 19). 
 359 See id at 183 (describing such an automatic prosecution policy). 
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failed to provide any360 or improved services when schools have 
failed to provide adequate services361—is at issue, defendants 
should be able to request the opportunity to address their disabil-
ity at school rather than in court by showing that the administra-
tive agency failed to consider fully whether court intervention 
was necessary. In child protection, a common phenomenon in-
volves authorities significantly increasing their removal and 
charging rates in response to a tragedy.362 If an agency did so 
without sufficiently considering alternatives to removal, then 
children’s and parents’ attorneys could seek dismissal of the re-
sulting petitions. 
Several jurisdictions have partial models for this type of re-
view. In Washington state, when an intake officer determines 
that a child otherwise eligible for diversion should be prosecuted, 
it must provide a “detailed statement of its reasons.”363 Washington 
cases have recognized a child defendant’s right to ensure that this 
decisionmaking is not arbitrary or capricious.364 A small number 
of other jurisdictions have explicitly permitted children to file mo-
tions to “dismiss for social reasons”—that is, move to dismiss a 
case not because the government’s allegations are false, but be-
cause court intervention is not necessary to achieve the family 
court’s rehabilitative goal.365 The language of these motions hark-
ens back to the family court’s historical oversight of charging dis-
cretion, asking the judge to overrule a subordinate’s decision to 
prosecute rather than divert a child’s case. Other states permit fam-
ily courts to dismiss cases at their own discretion but do not provide 
a meaningful standard for such review.366 Arbitrary-and-capricious 
review brings such review into the modern era by placing it 
 
 360 Public schools have a legal obligation to identify all children with disabilities—
known as “child find”—and provide appropriate special education services. 20 USC 
§ 1412(a)(3). If a child commits a crime that is a manifestation of a disability, it is reason-
able to consider whether remedying any child-find violation, rather than a family-court 
prosecution, is the best way to prevent a repeat offense. Willis, 2016 BYU Educ & L J at 
202–03 (cited in note 62). 
 361 Public schools have a legal obligation to provide a “free appropriate public educa-
tion” (FAPE) to children with disabilities. 20 USC § 1412(a)(1). As with child-find viola-
tions, charging decisions should consider whether remedying a FAPE violation or prose-
cution is most appropriate. 
 362 See text accompanying note 11. 
 363 Wash Rev Code § 13.40.080(13). 
 364 See, for example, State v Chatham, 624 P2d 1180, 1182 (Wash App 1981). 
 365 See DC Super Ct Rule Juv Proceedings 47-I(d); NH Rev Stat Ann § 169-B:10 (au-
thorizing the family court to, sua sponte or on a party’s motion, refer children to diversion 
programs); NY Fam Ct Law § 315.2 (motion to dismiss in furtherance of justice). 
 366 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-1410(A)(7). 
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within familiar administrative-law principles and supplying 
more meaningful standards for determining when cases ought to 
be dismissed. 
2. Judicial review as a tool to check racial and other 
disparities. 
A judicial check can help reduce the racial, gender, and other 
disparities that research has consistently documented in intake 
decisions. Previous research has found that intake officers asked 
girls more frequently than boys about past abuse or neglect, and 
that intake officers noted the “physical appearance, maturity, and 
sexuality of girls” with more frequency than with boys.367 Studies 
have reached similar findings regarding race at intake. Nation-
ally, black children referred to family courts are less likely to be 
diverted and more likely to be charged than white children,368 and 
these disparities have existed for years.369 Multiple studies have 
found that legal differences—like more severe offenses or a longer 
record of prior offenses—cannot fully explain these disparities, 
leading to the inference that authorities treat children differently 
based on their race.370 A recent study of one state’s intake data 
concluded that “being Black significantly increased the odds of 
receiving a referral at intake by 54%.”371 Older studies showed 
 
 367 Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, The Conundrum of Girls and Juvenile Justice 
Processing, in Bishop and Feld, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile 
Justice 485, 496 (cited in note 18). 
 368 See Investigation of the St. Louis County Family Court at *40 (cited in note 19) 
(showing a relative rate index of 0.7 for diversion—meaning that seven black children are 
diverted for every ten white children—and 1.2 for charging—meaning that twelve black 
children are prosecuted for every ten white children). See also C. Puzzanchera and S. 
Hockenberry, National Disproportionate Minority Contact Databook (OJJDP, 2017), 
online at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/dmcdb/asp/display.asp?year=2014&offense=1& 
display_in=1&displaytype=counts (visited Nov 13, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (re-
porting that 31.9 out of 100 referred cases were diverted for white youth, while 23.0 out of 
100 referred cases were diverted for minority youth in 2014). 
 369 See Puzzanchera and Hockenberry, National Disproportionate Minority Contact 
Databook (cited in note 368) (finding similar gaps for every year reported, from 1990 to 2013). 
 370 See Bishop and Leiber, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Delinquency and Justice 
System Reponses at 463 (cited in note 39). 
 371 Jennifer H. Peck and Wesley G. Jennings, A Criminal Examination of “Being 
Black” in the Juvenile Justice System, 40 L & Hum Behav 219, 226 (2016). These findings 
are particularly noteworthy because the authors used propensity score matching to com-
pare cases, a more sophisticated statistical technique than the regression analysis used in 
earlier studies. Id at 227. 
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similar biases.372 Problematic intake concerns about girls were es-
pecially prevalent for black girls.373 In one experiment, identifying 
children as black led probation officers to view children as “less 
immature and more violent, . . . more culpable, more likely to 
reoffend, and more deserving of punishment” than children with 
identical facts but no racial identification.374 
Judicial review of agency charging decisions could address 
some of these concerns. Deviating from agency protocol—by com-
menting on a child’s physical appearance or failing to ask about 
an abuse or neglect history—would be an important factor in de-
termining if the agency arbitrarily and capriciously determined 
that the child was in need of family-court intervention. More sys-
temically, agencies should be required to report aggregate statis-
tics regarding disparities. If those statistics show that race or gen-
der rather than individual child or family factors shaped intake 
decisions, that should also affect a determination whether the 
agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
Nonetheless, an agency model cannot itself address all dis-
parities. As Professor Tamar Birckhead has pointed out, consid-
eration of social factors could likely be a recipe for creating socio-
economic disparities because poor and black children are likely to 
have disproportionate amounts of social needs and thus be more 
likely to be seen by officials as in need of more intervention.375 But 
looking only at whether a crime occurred, and not whether a par-
ticular child needs court intervention, would both undermine the 
family court’s rehabilitative purpose and allow disparities in 
identifying and referring crimes to create disparities in family-
court involvement. And evaluating whether a prosecution is nec-
essary to serve a child’s needs—and thus evaluating whether 
other agencies can more effectively intervene—could help reduce 
the large disparities present in overall referrals to family court.376 
 
 372 See generally George S. Bridges and Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official As-
sessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 
Am Sociological Rev 554 (1998). 
 373 Kempf-Leonard, The Conundrum of Girls and Juvenile Justice Processing at 501 
(cited in note 367). 
 374 Sandra Graham and Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes 
about Adolescent Offenders, 28 L & Hum Behav 483, 496 (2004). 
 375 See generally Tamar Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 Wash U 
J L & Pol 53 (2012). 
 376 Nationally, authorities refer black children to family court at a relative rate 2.4 
times greater than they refer white children. See Investigation of the St. Louis County 
Family Court at *40 (cited in note 19). 
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D. More Democratic Accountability 
Perhaps counterintuitively, state agencies can be more dem-
ocratically accountable than locally elected prosecutors’ offices. 
State agencies’ power is granted by statute—which state legisla-
tures can amend to reform agencies. State agencies also depend 
on the legislature for budget appropriations and are subject to 
legislative oversight procedures.377 State agencies are subject to 
state administrative-procedure laws and public reporting re-
quirements.378 State agencies are generally supervised by gover-
nors,379 who can be held responsible for their successes or failures. 
Agency oversight mechanisms may be imperfect—juvenile 
justice and child protection rarely rises to the top of legislative or 
gubernatorial agendas—but they are superior to existing mecha-
nisms for local prosecutors. Even if voters are unlikely to elect 
legislators or governors based on their handling of juvenile justice 
and child protection issues, the various inter- and intrabranch ac-
countability mechanisms just listed can provide meaningful paths 
to democratic accountability. Those mechanisms are lacking for 
local elected prosecutors’ offices. While state departments of juve-
nile justice can be subject to detailed legislative oversight,380 local 
elections provide prosecutors’ offices with their own independent 
power base and thus insulate them from legislative or gubernato-
rial oversight.381 In addition, both judicial intake officers and 
elected prosecutors are generally exempt from state 
administrative-procedure laws—the former because they are part 
of the judicial branch and the latter because they are not regular 
state administrative agencies. Absent such procedures, there are 
 
 377 Professor David Freeman Engstrom has made a similar point comparing agency 
enforcement to private enforcement actions: “[P]ublic enforcers are politically accountable 
actors. Private enforcers are not.” Engstrom, 123 Yale L J at 638 (cited in note 67). 
 378 See, for example, DC Code § 4-1303.03(b)(10) (requiring detailed annual reporting 
from the District of Columbia’s child protection agency). 
 379 See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-320 (empowering the governor to appoint 
the director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, with the advice and consent of the state 
senate, and to fire the director). 
 380 See, for example, House Legislative Oversight Committee, Department of Juvenile 
Justice (South Carolina Legislature), archived at http://perma.cc/AJ3F-BVYK (listing 
meetings, public input, and committee investigations). 
 381 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the 
Threat of Tyranny, 86 Iowa L Rev 393, 451 (2001). 
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few mechanisms to hold them accountable for or provide public 
input into the procedures used to recommend prosecution or not.382 
Local prosecutors’ elections are weak substitutes for account-
ability mechanisms regarding state agencies. Local democratic 
accountability for family-court cases is particularly weak because 
family-court cases are often seen as less important than adult 
cases383 and are less likely to gain local media or voters’ attention 
than more severe crimes. Those cases are also confidential, reduc-
ing the ability of the public to hold prosecutors accountable.384 
Moreover, local prosecutors are more likely to be elected on a 
“tough-on-crime” platform385 that fails to give equal weight to the 
juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals, and many county 
elections may give greater weight to voters in richer and whiter 
areas than the neighborhoods in which a disproportionate num-
ber of people affected by cases filed by prosecutors live.386 
In addition, recent law-and-political-science scholarship has 
shown that local prosecutors are not as democratically accounta-
ble as their local elections might suggest. Residential political po-
larization renders many local elections noncompetitive.387 Prelim-
inary empirical research suggests that local crime and conviction 
rates do not actually affect district attorney elections.388 Another 
study found that the “overwhelming majority” of elected prosecu-
tors run unopposed389 and that turnout rates are particularly 
 
 382 See Pfaff, Locked In at 70 (cited in note 58) (describing how the “mishmash” of 
authority between local elected prosecutors, local jails, and state prisons diminishes over-
sight of local prosecutors’ decisions). 
 383 See Mears, The Front End of Juvenile Court at 581 (cited in note 18) (explaining 
that juvenile crimes have traditionally been seen as less important than crimes committed 
by adults, but that in recent decades “juvenile crime has garnered greater attention from 
the public and policy makers”) 
 384 See Davis, 86 Iowa L Rev at 443 (cited in note 381) (“[T]he electoral process for 
state and local prosecutors is an effective accountability measure only in the unlikely 
event that the electorate becomes aware of the abuse.”). 
 385 See Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor at 166 (cited 
in note 58). 
 386 See Pfaff, Locked In at 7 (cited in note 58). 
 387 See generally David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in City 
Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J L & Polit 419 (2007). 
 388 See Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform? Given 
Their Autonomy—Only If They Want to Be (The Atlantic, May 18, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/V7NL-NA9X. 
 389 American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, Roadblocks to Reform: District 
Attorneys, Elections, and the Criminal Justice Status Quo *4 (2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/MU6U-RPRC. 
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low.390 As a result, local prosecutor elections can be determined by 
a closed group of political party insiders or powerful interest 
groups like police unions. That is not a system that generally will 
provide democratic accountability. In particular, that is not a sys-
tem likely to hold prosecutors accountable to the competing goals 
of the juvenile justice or child protection systems, which are not 
likely to figure prominently in election campaigns. 
E. Better Agency Counseling 
Counseling is particularly important in agencies, as it can 
help ensure fidelity in individual cases to agency policy, and the 
literature regarding government attorneys has consistently con-
cluded that agency attorneys are best suited to fulfill that func-
tion. Accordingly, counseling functions have historically always 
resided in federal agencies,391 even when the DOJ centralized 
much of the federal government’s litigation authority.392 There is, 
of course, overlap between litigation and counseling functions.393 
Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and Dana Remus have found 
that, recognizing this overlap, some states grant some agencies 
the ability to litigate some matters on their own behalf.394 Such 
grants of agency litigation authority make particular sense when 
an agency’s overall programs and goals closely relate to its litiga-
tion activity.395 In such cases, the overlap between counseling and 
litigation is so significant that dividing it would risk harming the 
quality of either function. 
Juvenile justice and child protection law are fields in which 
counseling and prosecution functions significantly overlap—
determining which cases to file and which cases to handle outside 
of court relates to the agencies’ core missions. Litigating those 
cases becomes a significant amount of the work of such agencies—
 
 390 Pfaff, Locked In at 141–42 (cited in note 58) (noting low turnout rates and connect-
ing “voter apathy” to elected prosecutors’ longevity in office). 
 391 See Chambliss and Remus, 84 Fordham L Rev at 2049 (cited in note 70) (“The core 
function of the agency general counsel is to advise the agency.”); Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J 
Const L at 568–69 (cited in note 67); Herz, The Attorney Particular at 143 (cited in note 325). 
 392 See Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 568–69 (cited in note 67). 
 393 See Chambliss and Remus, 84 Fordham L Rev at 2049 (cited in note 70) (“Natu-
rally, there is some overlap between the two functions.”). 
 394 Id. 
 395 Devins has made this point in reference to independent federal agencies: “Since court 
action is a critical component of an agency’s regulatory agenda, litigation authority would 
seem to constitute an essential attribute of agency independence.” Devins, Toward an 
Understanding of Legal Policy-Making at Independent Agencies at 185 (cited in note 71). 
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measured both by the amount of resources such litigation re-
quires and how such litigation serves as the decision point for 
resource-intensive agency action (such as placing a child into a 
juvenile justice facility or a foster home). And an essential piece 
of the agency’s work is to match the children and families enter-
ing the agencies’ front door (through child protection or delin-
quency litigation) with the various services the agencies offer 
those families. Once litigation is chosen, the agency must address 
various questions that arise after adjudication, such as the appro-
priate placement for a child committed to a juvenile justice 
agency, whether a foster child can reunify with a parent or re-
quires a new family, and, if a new family is necessary, what legal 
arrangements for such families are most appropriate.396 
F. More Equality across Geographical Boundaries 
Agency authority also better achieves goals of equal treat-
ment within states because agencies work across states while 
prosecutors are elected on a local level. Even when child protec-
tion or juvenile justice agencies have county offices, those offices 
sit within a statewide administrative structure, providing some 
tools for statewide accountability397—while locally elected prose-
cutors do not encounter such tools. But even in those states, 
agency authority will be no less consistent across the state than 
elected prosecutor authority, as the latter is based on each local 
prosecutor’s office. 
A perennial concern in juvenile justice has been “justice by 
geography,”398 and inconsistent treatment by jurisdiction is par-
ticularly problematic when a “sanction is so severe and the stakes 
so high.”399 The sanction at issue in delinquency cases—the possi-
bility of being incarcerated in a state institution indefinitely, up 
 
 396 See Josh Gupta-Kagan, The New Permanency, 19 UC Davis J Juv L & Pol 1, 11–
26 (2015) (describing a continuum of permanency options); Herring, 24 U Toledo L Rev at 
673 (cited in note 213) (describing the need for attorneys to counsel child protection agen-
cies regarding permanency); Silverthorn, Agency Representation in Child Welfare 
Proceedings at 757–58 (cited in note 324) (describing counseling as “one of the agency at-
torney’s biggest roles”). 
 397 The precise types of such accountability and the variations of state agency over-
sight over county agencies are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 398 See, for example, US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention, Disproportionate Minority Contact Technical Assistance Manual 2-7 
to -8 (4th ed July 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/R46J-FLN5. See also generally Barry 
C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile Justice 
Administration, 82 J Crim L & Crimin 156 (1991). 
 399 Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 600 (cited in note 67). 
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to one’s twenty-first birthday, with a stigma analogous to that im-
posed by a criminal conviction400—makes this same concern apply 
to juvenile delinquency cases. A similar point can be made regard-
ing the sanctions and stigma of child protection cases.401 Devins 
and Herz have argued that agency litigation control is “likely to 
increase [consistency of government legal positions], if anything, 
because the litigating position will be the agency’s alone, without 
mediation or massaging by DOJ.”402 Lawyers represent agencies, 
not individual agency employees, and so the lawyer can take on a 
particularly important role in ensuring that the caseworker’s ac-
tions comport with agency policy.403 
The case is even stronger when applied to the state delin-
quency and child protection system and the choice is between 
an agency model and a different elected prosecutor’s office in 
every county. The latter creates a “mishmash of independent, 
often competitive” power centers, with the effect of limiting 
oversight of charging decisions.404 The former provides a struc-
ture with a greater ability to impose oversight and regularity 
on intake decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Family-court prosecutors have a different history and func-
tion than their criminal analogs, and prosecutorial discretion is 
as important in delinquency and child protection cases as in crim-
inal cases. Thus, family-court prosecutors deserve close study. 
They differ from criminal prosecutors in their purposes, which 
mix protecting individuals and the public from crime and child 
abuse and neglect with juvenile law’s historical focus on rehabili-
tating child and parent offenders. And they differ in the role of 
administrative agencies that are charged with pursuing those 
mixed goals. 
Those administrative agencies indicate the promise for a 
more coherent administrative structure. Those agencies have rel-
ative expertise regarding the cases they see and regarding the 
 
 400 Gault recognized that delinquency cases impose “only slightly less stigma” than 
criminal cases. Gault, 387 US at 23–24. 
 401 See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child 
Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment Special Needs 
Doctrine, 87 Tulane L Rev 353, 418–20 (2012) (discussing the stigma of child protection 
cases). 
 402 Devins and Herz, 5 U Pa J Const L at 574 (cited in note 67). 
 403 See Laver, Foundations for Success at 112–14 (cited in note 218). 
 404 Pfaff, Locked In at 70 (cited in note 58). 
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services available, depending on the case. They are thus best po-
sitioned to exercise prosecutorial discretion. 
Enacting a reform agenda involves several core steps. First, 
states should eliminate the vestiges of their pre-Gault intake 
structure. States should prevent private individuals from initiat-
ing court cases. Judicial-branch employees should have no role in 
determining which cases are filed and which are diverted. 
Second, states should create comprehensive agencies with an 
understanding of how cases proceed through a full range of 
options—and with the responsibility for administering those op-
tions. Most child protection agencies already are structured in 
this way, so the biggest change would be in juvenile justice, and 
would mean shifting intake and probation services to depart-
ments of juvenile justice.405 
Third, states should grant these comprehensive agencies 
prosecutorial authority—including the authority to determine 
whether to file and prosecute, divert, or dismiss a case. Especially 
once these agencies have the ability to see the full range of options 
available to respond to delinquency or child protection cases, they 
are best positioned to determine which cases need court interven-
tion and which do not. As a corollary, elected prosecutors should 
not have a role in these matters.406 
Fourth, agencies’ exercise of prosecutorial decisionmaking 
should be treated like other administrative decisions—and sub-
ject to judicial review. Agencies should have discretion, of course, 
but they should exercise that discretion within boundaries. They 
should be free, for instance, to evaluate the different interven-
tions provided to a fifteen-year-old who has committed a string of 
petty nonviolent offenses and determine that the child’s contin-
ued misconduct warrants court intervention. But they should not 
be free to avoid analysis of whether the child had the opportunity 
to receive appropriate special education services, for instance. 
 
 405 This structure would not address other important questions that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. For example, children’s Fifth Amendment rights would need protec-
tion, so juvenile justice agencies engaging in intake interviews should be prohibited from 
using any disclosures by a child in prosecuting that child. Such a rule echoes statutory 
protections already in place in many states. See, for example, SC Code Ann § 63-19-
1010(A). See also Birckhead, 46 Tex Tech L Rev at 167–68 (cited in note 19). In addition, 
a strong argument exists that children should have the right to counsel for some intake 
proceedings. Id at 166–71. 
 406 An exception should exist in determining when to seek waiver of family-court ju-
risdiction to prosecute a child in criminal court. Such decisions police the border between 
juvenile and adult court and, in my structure, between agencies and elected prosecutors 
exercising prosecutorial discretion. 
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These reforms would achieve multiple important goals. They 
would modernize family-court procedures. They would provide 
important and meaningful limits on prosecutorial discretion—
limits that have been difficult to identify for criminal prosecutors. 
And it would create a structure that is more likely to further ju-
venile justice and child protection systems’ policy goals. 
